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Abstract
We formulate a model of social interactions and misinferences by agents who neglect
assortativity in their society, mistakenly believing that they interact with a representative
sample of the population. A key component of our approach is the interplay between this
bias and agents’ strategic incentives. We highlight a mechanism through which assortativity neglect, combined with strategic complementarities in agents’ behavior, drives up
action dispersion in society (e.g., socioeconomic disparities in education investment). We
also suggest that the combination of assortativity neglect and strategic incentives may
be relevant in understanding empirically documented misperceptions of income inequality
and political attitude polarization.
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Introduction

A central channel through which people learn about their societies is by interacting with and
observing the behavior among their peers (e.g., neighbors, coworkers, online acquaintances).
Peers’ behavior (e.g., their consumption choices or political activities) may provide information
about behavior in society as a whole, as well as about key population characteristics (e.g.,
income or political attitude distributions). However, many social interactions are assortative,
in the sense that people interact more with others with similar characteristics: Richer people
are more likely than poorer people to have rich friends, and conservatives are more likely than
liberals to know other conservatives; indeed, evidence suggests that societies may be growing
increasingly assortative.1 As a result, the behavior that individuals observe among their peers
need not be representative of society. At the same time, there is evidence from psychology and
behavioral economics that people are prone to misinferences from non-representative data (see
Section 3.1).
In this paper, we formulate a model of social interactions and misinferences by agents who
suffer from assortativity neglect, i.e., mistakenly believe that they interact with a representative (or more representative than actual) sample of the population. A key component of
our approach is the interplay between this bias and agents’ strategic incentives. In particular,
we highlight a mechanism through which assortativity neglect, combined with strategic complementarities in agents’ behavior, drives up action dispersion in society (e.g., socioeconomic
disparities in education investment). We also suggest that the combination of assortativity
neglect and strategic incentives may be relevant in understanding some central empirical findings about people’s misperceptions of the income and political attitude distributions in their
societies.
Our main contributions are twofold. First, we perform an equilibrium analysis of the interplay between agents’ strategic behavior and the misinferences they draw from their peers’
behavior under assortativity neglect. We consider population games, where agents with ordered
types are matched in an assortative manner, and each agent’s optimal action may depend on
her type, the global action distribution in society as a whole, as well as the local action distribution among her matches. In an assortativity neglect equilibrium (ANE), we require that
each agent correctly perceives her local action distribution, but misperceives this to coincide
with the global action distribution and best-responds based on this misperception. This can
be interpreted as the steady state of a setting where successive generations of agents choose
actions based on only observing the behavior in their local neighborhoods and draw inferences
from these local observations under the misperception that society is non-assortative. Our main
1

E.g., Jargowsky (1996); Reardon and Bischoff (2011) find increased residential segregation by income, and
Bishop (2009); Brown and Enos (2021) document growing segregation by political attitudes in the US.
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results focus on linear-best response games with strategic complementarities. Here, we show
that ANE amplifies action dispersion relative to Nash equilibrium, by generating a gap between
high and low types’ perceptions of global behavior. This both increases the difference between
high and low types’ actions in any fixed society, and exacerbates the effect of social changes,
such as increased assortativity.
Second, we provide a theory of how agents form misperceptions about the type distribution
in society. Specifically, we ask whether agents who neglect assortativity can nevertheless explain
their observed local action distributions in a coherent manner, that is, by assuming that their
peers are behaving optimally in the population game. We show that the answer is yes; however,
the fact that agents reason about their peers’ incentives through the lens of assortativity neglect
leads them to systematically misperceive the type distribution, and we characterize how the
nature of social interactions shapes these misperceptions. Importantly, in our model, agents
draw inferences from their peers’ behavior, which is subject to strategic motivations. This gives
rise to different predictions than if agents directly observed peers’ types and made the purely
statistical error of projecting these onto society. For example, in the latter case, one would
expect agents to underestimate type dispersion, as peers are on average less diverse than the
overall population. In contrast, we show that our model additionally generates an attribution
error in agents’ reasoning about their peers’ incentives; under strategic complementarities, this
pushes in the opposite direction of the statistical error and can lead to overestimation of type
dispersion.
Misperceptions of income and political attitude distributions have received much attention
in recent empirical work, in part due to their potential to affect voters’ choices on important policy issues, such as redistribution. As we discuss, the interplay between the statistical
and attribution errors that we identify may be relevant in understanding some key findings in
this literature, in particular, the fact that both under- and overestimation of income inequality are common and evidence of widespread overestimation of political attitude polarization
(Section 4.4).
The paper proceeds as follows. To illustrate the model and some of our main findings,
Section 1.1 presents a simple parametric example in the context of education investment and
income-based residential sorting. Section 2 introduces general assortative societies and population games. Sections 3 and 4 consider, respectively, agents’ equilibrium behavior and formation
of coherent perceptions under assortativity neglect. Beyond the Gaussian societies in Section 1.1, ANE strategies and perceptions need not admit closed-form solutions. Instead, a
key observation facilitating our analysis is that every assortative society can be recast as a
monotone Markov process over its space of types. In linear best-response games with strategic complementarities, this allows us to analyze ANE behavior and perceptions in arbitrary
societies by considering the higher-order expectations of this process. Section 5 extends our
3

analysis to linear best-response games with strategic substitutes (Appendix C considers more
general best-response functions and weaker forms of assortativity neglect). Section 6 discusses
related literature and offers some concluding remarks.

1.1

Illustrative Example

Consider a continuum population of agents, each of whom is identified with an income level
θ ∈ R. The income distribution F in the population is Gaussian, with mean µ and variance
σ 2 > 0. Each agent knows her own income, but does not directly observe other agents’ incomes.
Due to neighborhood sorting by income, the richer an agent the more likely she is to interact
with other high-income agents. Specifically, pairwise interaction probabilities between any
agents θ and θ0 are summarized by a symmetric bivariate Gaussian distribution P with marginal
distribution F and correlation coefficient ρ ∈ (0, 1),
(θ, θ0 ) ∼P N

µ
µ

!
,

σ 2 ρσ 2
ρσ 2 σ 2

!!
.

The higher ρ the greater the degree of assortativity.
Each agent θ chooses a level s(θ) ∈ R of education investment.2 Assume that θ’s bestresponse against strategy profile s takes the form
BRθ (s) = θ + β EF [s(θ0 )] +γ EP [s(θ0 )|θ] ,
|´ {z }
|´ {z }
:= s(θ0 ) dF (θ0 )

:= s(θ0 ) dP (θ0 |θ)

with β, γ ≥ 0, β + γ < 1. Thus, richer agents have an intrinsic tendency to invest more in education; additionally, θ’s optimal education investment is increasing in global average investment
EF [s(θ0 )] in society as a whole (e.g., due to anticipated competition for college admissions/jobs
or economy-wide knowledge spillovers), and in local average investment EP [s(θ0 )|θ] among the
agents she interacts with (e.g., due to peer effects in learning).3 In the unique Nash equillibrium,
θ−µ
µ
sN E (θ) = 1−γρ
+ 1−β−γ
for each θ (see Example 1 for the derivation).
Nash equilibrium assumes that agents best-respond to correct perceptions of behavior in
society. In contrast, we assume that each agent correctly observes the local distribution of
education investments among the agents she interacts with; however, she mistakenly believes
this to coincide with the global distribution of education investments in society (which she does
not directly observe), because she neglects that society is assortative. We formalize this using
2

We consider education investment to include decisions such as expenditures on educational materials or
tutors or the amount of effort exerted at school, but assume school choice (and other decisions that might
endogenously affect sorting) to be exogenous (e.g., because everyone enrolls in their neighborhood school).
3
Bénabou (1993, 1996a,b); Fernández and Rogerson (1996, 2001); Durlauf (1996) consider related models
(without misperception) of education investment with sorting and global and/or local complementarities.
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the concept of assortativity neglect equilibrium (ANE), where
sAN (θ) = θ + (β + γ)EP [sAN (θ0 )|θ],
i.e., each agent θ’s action is a best-response to the correct local average investment EP [sAN (θ0 )|θ]
but the misperception that this is the same as global average investment. As Example 1 verifies,
θ−µ
µ
+ 1−β−γ
for each θ.
ANE actions are uniquely given by sAN (θ) = 1−(β+γ)ρ
Increased action dispersion. Our first main finding is that, under strategic complementarities, assortativity neglect increases action dispersion relative to Nash, through two channels.
First, in any given society, ANE leads to greater socioeconomic differences in education investment than Nash: Average education investment in society is the same under ANE and Nash,
but the variance is higher under assortativity neglect,


VarF sAN (θ) =



1
1 − (β + γ)ρ

2

2



σ ≥ VarF s

NE


(θ) =



1
1 − γρ

2

σ2.

(1)

The intuition is simple and reflects a mutually reinforcing interplay between agents’ misperceptions and behavior: Since richer agents are more likely than poorer ones to interact with
other rich agents, they tend to observe higher education investment among their peers. Under
assortativity neglect, this gives rise to a “false consensus effect:” Perceptions of global average
education investment in society, and hence of returns to education, are increasing in agents’
income and thus in their own investment. Relative to correct perceptions, this increases education investment differences between the rich and poor, which in turn, through observation of
their peers’ investment, feeds into the false consensus effect.
Second, assortativity neglect acts as a multiplier of social changes that increase action
dispersion. For instance, the effect of an increase in the degree ρ of neighborhood sorting is




∂
∂
VarF sAN (θ) ≥
VarF sN E (θ) ≥ 0.
∂ρ
∂ρ

(2)

Thus, socioeconomic education differences rise under Nash, but even more so under ANE. Intuitively, greater sorting has a direct effect on the education gap under Nash, by increasing
differences in local peer effects between richer and poorer agents. However, under ANE, this
additionally magnifies the false consensus effect, because both richer and poorer agents mistakenly attribute these new local education investment levels to a global trend in society, further
polarizing their responses. An increase in income inequality σ 2 has an analogous effect.
Coherent perceptions under assortativity neglect. Next, we ask whether and how
agents can “make sense” of their observed local action distributions through the lens of assortativity neglect. That is, when an agent θ suffers from assortativity neglect, can she explain

5

ρ

σ̂θ2 < σ 2

σ̂θ2 > σ 2

β+γ

Figure 1: Under-/overestimation of income inequality. (Perceptions are correct if ρ = 0 or ρ =

2(β+γ)
1+(β+γ)2 ).

the distribution of education investments she observes among her peers by assuming that they
are behaving optimally? Our second main finding is that the answer is yes, but that to explain
her observations, θ must misperceive the income distribution in society in a particular way.
Specifically, under ANE, the local distribution of education investments that θ observes has
mean EP [sAN (θ0 )|θ] =: aθ and variance VarP [sAN (θ0 ) | θ]. Since θ neglects assortativity, she
believes that this local distribution is representative of the investment distributions in all other
neighborhoods and in society as a whole. Thus, from θ’s perspective, each agent θ0 ’s optimal
education investment choice is θ0 + (β + γ)aθ . As Example 2 verifies, the only way that θ can
explain her observed local investment mean and variance as arising from such optimal choices
is if θ perceives the income mean and variance among her peers, and hence in society, to be
µ̂θ = (1 − β − γ)aθ ,

σ̂θ2 = VarP [sAN (θ0 ) | θ] =

σ 2 (1 − ρ2 )
.
(1 − (β + γ)ρ)2

(3)

Misperceptions of income inequality. Based on this, we can examine how agents’ misperceptions of the income distribution are influenced by the nature of their social interactions.
For example, consider θ’s perceived income inequality σ̂θ2 in (3). This is increasing in β + γ, and
2(β+γ)
exceeds the true income inequality σ 2 if and only if 1+(β+γ)
2 > ρ. Thus, as Figure 1 shows, θ
underestimates (resp. overestimates) income inequality when complementarities β + γ are small
(resp. large) relative to the degree of assortativity ρ.
This finding reflects two opposing errors in θ’s reasoning under assortativity neglect. On
the one hand, a purely statistical error : Income inequality σ 2 (1 − ρ2 ) among θ’s peers is lower
than in the overall population. Thus, viewing her peers as representative of society pushes θ to
underestimate income inequality. On the other hand, an attribution error : Rather than directly
observing her peers’ incomes, θ must infer these from their observed investment decisions.
However, due to her assortativity neglect, θ fails to take into account that the rich and poor are
subject to different peer effects, because she mistakenly believes that everyone faces the same
local average investment aθ . As a result, she misattributes all observed investment differences
6

to variation in income. This creates a force for overestimating income inequality. Under larger
complementarities, the second channel is stronger and can dominate the first one.
Strategic substitutes. Finally, in addition to strategic complementarities, it is also important to consider settings with global and/or local strategic substitutes (β < 0 and/or γ < 0).
For example, while above we pointed to several natural channels why individuals’ incentives to
invest in education may be increasing in global education investment in society, there are other
well-documented forces that push in the opposite direction (e.g., a higher supply of educated
workers tends to depress the wage skill premium in labor markets). As we will see (Section 5),
if these forces are strong enough that β < 0, then this reverses some of the preceding results;
e.g., now assortativity neglect decreases action dispersion relative to Nash equilibrium.

2

Setting

There is a continuum of agents with mass normalized to 1. Each agent is endowed with a type
θ ∈ R. An agent’s type is her private information. Agents interact according to a random
matching technology. A society P specifies the probability with which any pair of types θ and
θ0 are matched:4
Definition 1. A society is a joint cdf P over R × R that is:
1. symmetric: P (θ, θ0 ) = P (θ0 , θ) for all θ, θ0
2. assortative: P (·|θ) first-order stochastically dominates P (·|θ0 ) if θ ≥ θ0 .
Symmetry is a consistency condition required to describe a random matching in a population.
Assortativity captures the idea that higher types are (weakly) more likely than lower types
to interact with other high types. Note that a society P jointly summarizes an underlying
type distribution, described by the marginal distribution F := margΘ P , and a matching
technology , which for every type θ specifies the conditional distribution P (·|θ) of θ’s matches.
´
We assume that the type distribution F is absolutely continuous with |θ|dF (θ) < ∞ and has
a connected support, denoted by Θ. Let F denote the set of all cdfs with these properties. We
call society P non-assortative if P = F × F is the independent product of its marginals, so
that each type θ’s match distribution P (·|θ) = F coincides with the type distribution in society
as a whole. In the Gaussian parametrization in Section 1.1, P is non-assortative if and only if
the correlation coefficient ρ = 0.
Society P is engaged in the following population game. Agents have a common action set,
given by a measurable A ⊆ R. A strategy profile is a measurable function s : Θ → A that
4

Throughout, we treat society P as exogenous. See Pin and Rogers (2016) for a survey of potential sources
of assortativity, including institutional constraints or socio-psychological factors.
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´
specifies an action s(θ) for each type θ and satisfies |s(θ)|dF (θ) < ∞. Each strategy profile
s induces a global action distribution Gs,P , i.e., the cdf over actions when types are drawn
according to F and behave according to s:
ˆ
s,P

G

1{s(θ0 )≤a} dF (θ0 ) for all a ∈ A.

(a) :=
Θ

For each type θ, s also induces a local action distribution Ls,P
θ . This is the distribution of
actions among θ’s matches, i.e., the cdf over actions when types are drawn according to P (·|θ):
ˆ
Ls,P
θ (a)

1{s(θ0 )≤a} dP (θ0 |θ) for all a ∈ A.

:=
Θ

coincides
Note that when P = F ×F is non-assortative, each type’s local action distribution Ls,P
θ
s,P
with the global action distribution Gs,P for all s. However, Lθ generally differs from Gs,P when
P is assortative. Finally, for each type θ, the game specifies a best-response correspondence
BRθ : ∆(A) × ∆(A) → A. For any strategy profile s, the set of optimal actions for θ is
given by BRθ (Gs,P , Ls,P
θ ), which depends on s only through the induced global and local action
distributions Gs,P and Ls,P
θ .
The next section defines an equilibrium concept that applies to any population game of the
above form. However, our main results will focus on linear best-response functions with
strategic complementarities (Section 5 extends to strategic substitutes, while Appendix C.4
considers non-linear best response functions): Here, A = R and there exist coefficients β, γ ≥ 0
with β + γ < 1 such that each type θ’s best-response against strategy profile s is the unique
action given by
ˆ
s,P

BRθ (G

, Ls,P
θ )

:= θ + β

ˆ
s,P

a dG

(a) + γ

0
0
a dLs,P
θ (a) = θ + βEF [s(θ )] + γEP [s(θ )|θ]. (4)

The first term captures that higher types have an intrinsic tendency to take higher actions.
The second term captures society-wide strategic complementarities, whereby each type θ’s
best-response is increasing in the global average action. Finally, by the third term, θ’s bestresponse is also increasing in the average behavior among her matches, reflecting local strategic
complementarities.5
While stylized, best-response functions of this form are widely used in the literature on
network games (for a survey, see Jackson and Zenou, 2013) and can capture a rich class of economic applications. In addition to education investment (Section 1.1), other examples include
5

While our analysis takes best-response functions as its primitive, one possible utility function that induces
2
´´
(4) is U (a, θ, G, Lθ ) = −
a − θ − βa0 − γa00 dG(a0 ) dLθ (a00 ); that is, θ faces a quadratic miscoordination
cost that reflects the gap between her action a and a weighted sum of her type and the actions a0 in society and
a00 among her matches.
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many consumption decisions that depend on income positively, but may also exhibit both direct
peer-to-peer consumption complementarities and material or socio-psychological global payoff
complementarities (e.g., economy-wide technological spillovers or a desire to adhere to a social
norm). Likewise, types might represent political attitudes on a left-right spectrum and actions
the extent to which agents manifest support for particular positions, where related local and
global complementarity/conformity motives may be at play.

3

Behavior under Assortativity Neglect

3.1

Assortativity Neglect Equilibrium

The standard solution concept of Nash equilibrium assumes that all agents best-respond to
correct perceptions about others’ behavior. That is, in our population game, strategy profile s
is a Nash equilibrium if each type θ’s action s(θ) ∈ BRθ (Gs,P , Ls,P
θ ) is a best-response to the
true global and local action distributions under s.
In this paper, we consider an alternative solution concept, assortativity neglect equilibrium.
Here, each agent θ correctly perceives her local action distribution Ls,P
θ , but mistakenly perceives
the global action distribution to coincide with this local action distribution, and best-responds
based on this misperception:
Definition 2. A strategy profile s is an assortativity neglect equilibrium (ANE) if s(θ) ∈
s,P
BRθ (Ls,P
θ , Lθ ) for each θ.
One interpretation of ANE is as the steady state of a hypothetical dynamic setting, where
successive generations of agents choose actions based on (i) only observing the behavior in their
local neighborhoods and (ii) the misperception that society is non-assortative, which we refer
to as assortativity neglect. Concretely, suppose that before a t-th generation agent θ chooses
s
,P
her action st (θ), the only information available to her is the local action distribution Lθt−1
among the previous generation’s types from her match distribution P (·|θ). She does not observe
the global action distribution Gst−1 ,P (nor her matches’ types or payoffs). However, since she
suffers from assortativity neglect, she mistakenly believes Gst−1 ,P to coincide with her observed
local action distribution, because she perceives her matches to be a representative sample of
s
,P
s
,P
society. Given this, she best-responds by choosing st (θ) ∈ BRθ (Lθt−1 , Lθt−1 ). Steady states
of this setting correspond to the fixed-point condition in Definition 2.6
Assortativity neglect can be seen as a form of projection bias, where each agent projects
her own local action observations onto everyone else in society; related projections of local
6

Analogous learning motivations, but under different forms of misinference from observed feedback, underlie
solution concepts such as analogy-based expectation and cursed equilibrium; see Section 6.1.
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observations are documented in the empirical literature on “network cognition.” 7 Agents’ misperception that their observed local action distributions are representative of behavior in society
as a whole also bears some resemblance to the experimentally documented bias of selection neglect (Esponda and Vespa, 2014, 2018; Barron, Huck, and Jehiel, 2019; Enke, 2020), where
subjects fail to take into account that the information they see (in our setting, agents’ local
action distributions) is subject to selection effects.
Finally, a basic idea motivating ANE is that agents are better able to observe their local action distributions than the global action distribution. This seems natural in many applications,
such as the setting in Section 1.1: Education investment levels among one’s peers are readily
observable based on day-to-day interactions, but learning about education investment levels in
society as a whole might require one to research other sources or to draw inferences from peers’
payoffs (e.g., labor market outcomes) that may not yet be known at the time of choosing one’s
own education investment.8 At the same time, the assumption underlying ANE that agents
have no information about the global action distribution and view their local action distributions as fully representative of it is, of course, extreme. In Appendix C.2, we consider less
extreme formulations, where some fraction of agents know the true global action distribution
or agents only partially project their local action distributions onto the global distribution.
Remark 1. ANE clearly coincides with Nash equilibrium in non-assortative societies P or
s,P
in population games where best-responses BRθ (Gs,P , Ls,P
θ ) = BRθ (Lθ ) depend only on local
action distributions. Beyond these special cases, the two solution concepts generally differ, even
s,P
in the widely studied setting where best-responses BRθ (Gs,P , Ls,P
) depend only
θ ) = BRθ (G
on global action distributions (i.e., γ = 0 in the case of linear best-responses). In the latter
environment, local action distributions are not directly relevant for incentives and hence play no
role under Nash, but they nevertheless affect ANE through agents’ misinference that their local
action distributions match the global action distribution. We allow best-responses to depend
on both global and local action distributions as this is natural in many economic applications,
but our main insights will apply even under purely global strategic externalities.
N

3.2

Action Dispersion under Assortativity Neglect

To analyze and contrast behavior under Nash and ANE in detail, we focus on the linear bestresponse functions with strategic complementarities given by (4).
A key observation facilitating our analysis is the following. Even though our model is static,
we can think of any society P as inducing a discrete-time Markov process over its space of types
7

E.g., Dessi, Gallo, and Goyal (2016) elicit subjects’ assessments of degree distributions on a network and
find that subjects project their own observed number of neighbors onto other agents in the network.
8
Indeed, Section 3.4 discusses empirical evidence on misperceptions of returns to education.
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Θ: The initial distribution is given by the type distribution F = margΘ P and the transition
kernel is the matching technology (P (·|θ))θ∈Θ . That is, this process first draws an initial type
θ0 ∈ Θ according to F , then draws type θ0 ’s match θ1 according to P (·|θ0 ), type θ1 ’s match
θ2 according to P (·|θ1 ), and so on. We refer to this Markov process as the process of t-step
ahead matches in society and also denote it by P . Assortativity of P corresponds precisely to
this process being monotone (Daley, 1968); this feature will play an essential role throughout
our analysis.
The process of t-step ahead matches yields a simple description of the Nash equilibrium of
our game. By the best-response condition (4), s is a Nash equilibrium if and only if, for all θ,
0
0
s(θ) = BRθ (Gs,P , Ls,P
θ ) = θ + βEF [s(θ )] + γEP [s(θ )|θ].

(5)

By iterating this fixed-point condition under the Markov process P and exploiting the linearity
of the best-response function, we obtain that, for all θ and τ ∈ N,
s(θ) = θ + βEF [s(θ0 )] + γEP [s(θ1 ) | θ0 = θ]


= θ + βEF [s(θ0 )] + γ EP [θ1 | θ0 = θ] + βEF [s(θ0 )] + γEP [s(θ2 ) | θ0 = θ] = . . .
=

τ
X



γ t EP [θt | θ0 = θ] + βEF [s(θ0 )] + γ τ +1 EP [s(θτ +1 ) | θ0 = θ],

t=0

where each step applies the law of iterated expectations. In Appendix B.1, we verify that the
higher-order term γ τ +1 EP [s(θτ +1 )|θ0 = θ] vanishes as τ → ∞ and obtain the following result:
Lemma 1 (Nash equilibrium). For any (P, β, γ), there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. Nash
strategies are strictly increasing in types, with
sN E (θ) =

∞
X

γ t EP [θt |θ0 = θ] +

t=0

βEF [θ0 ]
for all θ.
(1 − γ)(1 − β − γ)

(6)

Thus, θ’s Nash equilibrium action is a weighted average of a γ-discounted sum of her expected t-step ahead matches and a constant that depends only on β, γ, and the type mean
EF [θ0 ] in society. Her behavior is increasing in her type for two reasons: First, higher types
prefer higher actions. Second, due to local complementarities, θ’s behavior is increasing in her
matches’ behavior, which in turn is increasing in their matches’ behavior, etc., and higher types
are more likely to meet other high types. This is reflected by the fact that θ’s action depends
on all the t-step ahead expectations EP [θt |θ0 = θ], which are (weakly) increasing in θ due to
the monotonicity of the Markov process P .

11

By contrast, any ANE s must satisfy the fixed-point condition
s,P
0
s(θ) = BRθ (Ls,P
θ , Lθ ) = θ + (β + γ)EP [s(θ )|θ].

(7)

Analogous to the derivation of Nash equilibrium, iterating (7) implies that the ANE is
uniquely given by
∞
X
sAN (θ) =
(β + γ)t EP [θt |θ0 = θ] for all θ.
(8)
t=0

That is, θ’s action is a (β + γ)-discounted sum of her expected t-step ahead matches under P .9
An important implication is that, under global complementarities, assortativity neglect
increases action dispersion relative to Nash equilibrium. Formally, comparing (6) and (8), the
fact that t-step ahead expectations EP [θt |θ0 = θ] are increasing in θ and that β ≥ 0 implies
sAN (θ) − sAN (θ0 ) ≥ sN E (θ) − sN E (θ0 ) for all θ > θ0 .
Equivalently, the global action distribution GAN under ANE is more dispersive than the Nash
−1
−1
−1
−1
global action distribution GN E ; that is, GAN (x) − GAN (y) ≥ GN E (x) − GN E (y) for all
EF [θ]
), this
0 < y ≤ x < 1. Since the average actions under (6) and (8) are the same (namely, 1−β−γ
implies that GAN is a mean-preserving spread of GN E .10
Proposition 1 (Assortativity neglect equilibrium). For any (P, β, γ), the unique ANE sAN is
given by (8). The global action distribution GAN under ANE is more dispersive than the Nash
action distribution GN E .
As illustrated in Section 1.1, Proposition 1 reflects the following intuition: Under any monotonic strategy profile, higher types face higher local action distributions, which under assortativity neglect, they view as representative of the global action distribution. This is reminiscent of
the widely documented “false consensus effect” in social psychology (Ross, Greene, and House,
1977; Marks and Miller, 1987), whereby people’s perceptions of others’ behaviors (or attributes)
tend to be positively correlated with their own behaviors and attributes. Proposition 1 highlights that, when combined with global strategic complementarities, this effect drives up the
gap between higher and lower types’ best-responses, further reinforcing the differences in their
local action distributions and hence in their perceived global action distributions.11 In contrast,
9

In line with the learning motivation of ANE in Section 3.1, (8) can be seen as stable steady state of the
following adjustment process: Starting with any monotone strategy profile s0 , if successive generations of agents
st−1 ,P
s
,P
best-respond to previous period behavior according to st (θ) ∈ BR
, Lθt−1´ ), play converges to (8).
´ θ (Lθ
10
Recall that cdf G1 is a mean-preserving spread of G2 if φ(a) dG1 (a) ≥ φ(a) dG2 (a) for any convex
function φ : R → R for which the integrals are well-defined. For cdfs that share the same mean, the dispersive
order is stronger than the mean-preserving spread order (e.g., Shaked and Shanthikumar, 2007).
11
The welfare implications of Proposition 1 depend on whether ANE payoffs are interpreted objectively or
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as we will see in Section 5, when combined with global strategic substitutes (β < 0), the false
consensus effect has the opposite implication and ANE action dispersion is lower than Nash.
Example 1. In the Gaussian parametrization from Section 1.1, each type θ’s match distribution
P (·|θ) is also normal with mean EP [θ1 |θ0 = θ] = (1 − ρ)µ + ρθ; inductively, EP [θt |θ0 = θ] = (1 −
θ−µ
µ
ρt )µ+ρt θ for all t. Thus, applying (6) and (8) yields the strategy profiles sN E (θ) = 1−γρ
+ 1−β−γ
θ−µ
µ
and sAN (θ) = 1−(β+γ)ρ
+ 1−β−γ
from Section 1.1. As noted in (1), ANE features a higher action
variance than Nash, in line with Proposition 1.
N

3.3

Multiplier Effect of Assortativity Neglect

Proposition 1 shows that, under strategic complementarities, assortativity neglect increases
action dispersion relative to Nash in any fixed environment. Continuing to focus on linear bestresponse games with strategic complementarities, we now highlight a second channel through
which assortativity neglect can lead to more dispersed behavior: by amplifying the effect of
several key social changes.
We first consider increases in assortativity or type heterogeneity. To disentangle these two
changes, we use an equivalent representation of societies that re-expresses who interacts with
whom in terms of type quantiles x ∈ [0, 1]. For any society P , let C(x, y) be the probability
that two types with quantiles below x and y are matched:

C(x, y) := P F −1 (x), F −1 (y) for all x, y ∈ (0, 1),

(9)

and C(x, 0) = C(0, x) = 0, C(x, 1) = C(1, x) = x for all x. Note that C is a copula (i.e., a
cdf over [0, 1]2 with uniform marginals) and inherits symmetry and assortativity from P . We
refer to symmetric and assortative copulas as interaction structures. Any society induces
an interaction structure via (9). Conversely, any interaction structure C and type distribution
F yield a society by setting P (θ, θ0 ) := C(F (θ), F (θ0 )). Under this decomposition of societies
into pairs (F, C), one can vary each component freely while holding the other fixed.
We call interaction structure C1 more assortative than C2 if C1 (x, y) ≥ C2 (x, y) for any
x, y ∈ (0, 1); that is, C1 assigns higher probability than C2 to “low-low” matches between agents
with quantiles below any cutoffs x and y.12 The least assortative interaction structure is given
by CI (x, y) = xy for all x, y; for any F , this induces the non-assortative society (F, CI ) = F ×F .
The most assortative C matches each quantile only with types of the same quantile. In Gaussian
subjectively (i.e., based on the true global action distribution GAN or agents’ perceived global action distribuAN
tions Lsθ ,P ). E.g., under the quadratic miscoordination utilities in footnote 5, objective ANE welfare is always
Pareto-worse than Nash due to the higher action dispersion, but subjective ANE welfare can be lower or higher
than Nash depending on parameters (see Appendix E.3 of the previous version, Frick, Iijima, and Ishii, 2019).
12
Equivalently, C1 assigns higher probability to “high-high” matches between quantiles above any two cutoffs.
This corresponds to the PQD order over bivariate cdfs used in statistics (e.g., Shaked and Shanthikumar, 2007).
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societies, the interaction structure depends only on the correlation coefficient ρ, where higher
ρ corresponds to more assortativity. For simplicity, we henceforth focus on the class C of
interaction structures that admit positive and absolutely continuous densities on (0, 1)2 .
To consider the effect of increased assortativity, we compare Nash and ANE global action
AN
AN
NE
E
across environments (F, Ci , β, γ) that differ
distributions and strategies GN
i , si , Gi , si
only in their interaction structures Ci :
Proposition 2 (Effect of assortativity). For any C1 , C2 ∈ C, the following are equivalent:
1. C1 is more assortative than C2 .
E
E
2. GN
is a mean-preserving spread of GN
for all (F, β, γ).
1
2

for all (F, β, γ).
is a mean-preserving spread of GAN
3. GAN
2
1
4. For all θ∗ ∈ Θ and (F, β, γ),
AN
∗
NE
NE
∗
EF [sAN
1 (θ) − s2 (θ) | θ ≥ θ ] ≥ EF [s1 (θ) − s2 (θ) | θ ≥ θ ] ≥ 0.

Proposition 2 captures a tight connection between increased assortativity and action dispersion under strategic complementarities: Not only does more assortativity lead to greater action
dispersion (by “1 ⇒ 2, 3”), but greater action dispersion is indeed a defining feature of more
assortative societies (by “2, 3 ⇒ 1”). However, while this is true under both Nash and ANE,
part 4 highlights that any given rise in assortativity has a stronger effect on action dispersion
under assortativity neglect: Generalizing the parametric multiplier effect in (2), high types’
actions increase more on average (equivalently, low types’ actions decrease more) than under
Nash.13 Indeed, under purely global complementarities (γ = 0, β > 0), a rise in assortativity
has no effect on Nash action dispersion, which always equals type dispersion; however, it still
increases ANE action dispersion.
Section 1.1 discussed the intuition for the forward direction: A rise in assortativity increases
differences in local complementarity incentives across types (under Nash and ANE), but under
ANE it additionally increases differences in perceived global complementarity incentives by
magnifying the false consensus effect. To prove the formal equivalence, we exploit the Markov
process representations of Nash and ANE in (6) and (8), which reduces the problem to a
comparison of expected t-step ahead matches across different societies. A key step is to establish
an equivalence between the more-assortative order over interaction structures Ci and the meanpreserving spread order over the distributions of all t-step ahead expectations of the Markov
processes Pi = (F, Ci ); this relies crucially on the monotonicity of these processes.
For • ∈ {NE, AN}, G•1 is a mean-preserving spread of G•2 iff EF [s•1 (θ) − s•2 (θ) | θ ≥ θ∗ ] ≥ 0 for all θ∗ . Thus,
part 4 captures that the mean-preserving spread increase from G•2 to G•1 is greater under ANE than Nash.
13
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Finally, as we will see in Section 5, under local strategic complementarities but stronger
global substitutes (i.e., γ > 0, β + γ < 0), increasing assortativity increases Nash action
dispersion but decreases ANE action dispersion. Thus, in this case, the comparative statics of
Nash and ANE have opposite directions, rather than differing in magnitude as in Proposition 2.
E
across environand GAN
An analogous result to Proposition 2 holds when comparing GN
i
i
ments (Fi , C, β, γ) that differ only in their type distributions. Increased type dispersion (e.g.,
an increase in income inequality σ 2 in Section 1.1) corresponds to increased action dispersion
under both Nash and ANE, but the effect is stronger under ANE:14
Proposition 3 (Effect of type dispersion). For any F1 , F2 ∈ F, the following are equivalent:
1. F1 is more dispersive than F2 .
E
E
for all (C, β, γ).
2. GN
is more dispersive than GN
1
2

3. GAN
is more dispersive than GAN
for all (C, β, γ).
1
2
4. For all (C, β, γ) and x, y ∈ (0, 1) with x > y,
E
E
∆x,y GAN
− ∆x,y GAN
≥ ∆x,y GN
− ∆x,y GN
≥ 0,
1
2
1
2

where ∆x,y G := G−1 (x) − G−1 (y) for any cdf G.
Finally, we show that changes in complementarity motives can have qualitatively distinct
effects under Nash and ANE:
E
Proposition 4 (Effect of complementarity motives). Consider GN
and GAN
in environments
i
i
(F, C, βi , γi ) (i = 1, 2). We have:
E
E
1. γ1 ≥ γ2 ⇐⇒ GN
is more dispersive than GN
for all (F, C) and all β1 , β2 .
1
2

2. β1 + γ1 ≥ β2 + γ2 ⇐⇒ GAN
is more dispersive than GAN
for all (F, C).
1
2
Thus, Nash action dispersion is increasing in local complementarity motives γ, but is unaffected by changes in global complementarity motives β. In contrast, ANE action dispersion
additionally increases with β, as this amplifies the role of the false consensus effect. In particular, if γ1 > γ2 , but β1 + γ1 < β2 + γ2 , then Nash action dispersion is greater in the first
environment than the second, but ANE action dispersion is greater in the second than the first.
14

An analogous equivalence holds replacing the more-dispersive order with the mean-preserving spread order.
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3.4

Discussion

We briefly interpret the preceding analysis in the context of the education investment example
from Section 1.1. A large literature studies the effect of income-based residential sorting on
socioeconomic education inequality (for a survey, see Fernández, 2003). Much theoretical and
empirical work highlights the role of local complementarities, such as peer effects or local
provision of educational facilities. Under Nash, we saw that such local complementarities are
the only channel through which sorting affects the socioeconomic education gap in our setting.
In contrast, the ANE analysis captures an additional inferential channel that is absent
under Nash: If marginal returns to education are increasing in global education investment and
if people project their peers’ education choices onto society, then sorting also affects education
inequality by leading to a socioeconomic perception gap about the returns to education. In
line with this channel, more recent empirical work documents the role of perceived returns to
education in shaping individuals’ education investment and finds that disadvantaged individuals
often substantially underestimate these returns.1516
Taking into account this inferential channel may be important for two reasons. First, as
formalized by the multiplier effect in Proposition 2, this further strengthens the rationale for
programs, such as “Moving to Opportunity,” that aim to reduce income-based residential segregation. Second, the inferential channel suggests that additional reductions in education inequality might be achieved through informational interventions aimed at correcting misperceptions.
Recent empirical work has begun to study such interventions and has found significant effects.17

4

Perceptions under Assortativity Neglect

4.1

Coherent Perceptions

So far, we have focused on agents’ behavior under assortativity neglect, by defining a solution
concept, ANE, where agents only observe their local action distributions and best-respond based
on the misperception that these local action distributions match the global action distribution.
15

E.g., Jensen (2010) finds that predominantly poor students in the Dominican Republic underestimate the
returns of secondary vs. primary school (resp. college vs. secondary school) by on average 78% (resp. 70%),
with underestimation strongest among the poorest students; moreover, perceived returns significantly predict
subsequent actual years of schooling. See also Nguyen (2008) and Attanasio and Kaufmann (2014).
16
Streufert (2000) proposes a different model of misperceptions about returns to education: For each education
level s, there is an exogenous true earnings distribution Fs , but poor agents observe a truncation Fsα that omits
earnings above an exogenous cap α (e.g., because successful agents leave poor neighborhoods). He assumes that
poor agents misperceive Fsα to represent true earnings, but highlights that this has an ambiguous effect: their
α
perceived marginal returns E[Fsα ]−E[Fs−1
] to education may under- or overstate the true returns E[Fs ]−E[Fs−1 ].
17
The aforementioned Jensen (2010) finds that providing one-time information about true returns to education
generates lasting increases in students’ perceived returns and increases completed schooling by 0.2-0.35 years
over 4 years. In Nguyen (2008), similar interventions raise students’ test scores by 0.2-0.37 standard deviations.
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In this section, we take the perspective that agents not only use their local action observations to decide on a best-response. Rather, as emphasized, for instance, by the social psychology
literature, we assume that agents also seek to build “coherent stories” that can explain this observed behavior within its social context.18 Through these stories, agents’ assortativity neglect
not only shapes their equilibrium behavior, but also their perceptions of the type distribution
in society and of other types’ behavior.
Specifically, in any population game, we introduce the following simple formalization of how
agents form coherent perceptions under assortativity neglect:
Definition 3. Given any society P and ANE sAN , a coherent assortativity neglect perception for type θ consists of a perceived non-assortative society P̂θ = F̂θ × F̂θ and a perceived
strategy profile ŝθ such that:
AN ,P

1. Observational consistency: Lθs

= Lŝθθ ,P̂θ .

2. Perceived best-response: for each θ0 , ŝθ (θ0 ) ∈ BRθ0 (Gŝθ ,P̂θ , Lŝθθ0 ,P̂θ ).
That is, given an ANE sAN , we continue to assume that the only information that agent θ
AN
observes is her local action distribution Lsθ ,P . Based on this, she forms a perception F̂θ of the
type distribution (which, since she neglects assortativity, means that her perceived society is
P̂θ = F̂θ × F̂θ ) and a perception ŝθ of the strategy profile in society. These perceptions satisfy
two requirements:
First, they are consistent with θ’s observed local action distribution. That is, θ’s perceived
AN
local action distribution Lŝθθ ,P̂θ matches her true local action distribution Lsθ ,P .
Second, they allow θ to explain her observed local action distribution within its social
context, by assuming that other agents behave optimally in the population game. That is, the
action ŝθ (θ0 ) that θ attributes to any other type θ0 is a best-response for θ0 to the global and
local action distributions Gŝθ ,P̂θ and Lŝθθ0 ,P̂θ that θ perceives θ0 to face.
To interpret the second requirement, note that, since θ perceives society to be non-assortative,
she believes that her own local action distribution coincides with the global action distribution
and all other agents’ local action distributions. Thus, combined with the first assumption that
θ is correct about her local action distribution, the second requirement simplifies to
AN ,P

ŝθ (θ0 ) ∈ BRθ0 (Lsθ

AN ,P

, Lsθ

).

(10)

This way of reasoning about others’ behavior is a natural continuation of the projection bias
underlying assortativity neglect: θ’s own action sAN (θ) is a best-response to the perception
18

The idea that people do not simply take note of the behavior of those around them, but try to explain this
behavior based on a combination of internal and environmental causes underlies the field of attribution theory
in social psychology (e.g., Heider, 1958; Kelley and Michela, 1980).
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AN ,P

that the global and local action distributions throughout society are Lsθ
believes that the same is true of other agents’ actions.

, and she naively

Remark 2. For parsimony, Definition 3 does not explicitly model θ’s perceptions about other
agents’ perceptions, but the perceived best-response condition implicitly suggests a self-centered
view: θ perceives other agents to best-respond based on her own perceptions P̂θ and ŝθ . While
such naively self-centered perceptions can again be viewed as a natural continuation of the
projection bias underlying assortativity neglect,19 they might seem restrictive. However, we
note that they are not essential for our analysis.
Indeed, Appendix C.1 extends Definition 3 to allow θ to perceive that other agents’ perceived societies and strategy profiles disagree with her own perceptions. We show that θ’s own
perceived society and strategy profile P̂θ and ŝθ remain unchanged relative to Definition 3,
as long as θ perceives that (i) other agents also perceive society to be non-assortative, (ii)
other agents behave optimally given their perceptions, and (iii) other agents’ perceptions are
consistent with their observed local action distributions. As we discuss, this can be seen as a
misspecified version of Esponda’s (2013) (level-1) rationalizable conjectural equilibrium.
N

4.2

Existence and Uniqueness of Coherent Perceptions

To analyze agents’ perceptions, we return to linear best-response games with strategic complementarities. Our first result is that agents are always able to form coherent assortativity neglect
perceptions. Thus, no matter how assortative the actual society P is, agents who suffer from
assortativity neglect are still able to explain the behavior they observe in a coherent manner.20
Moreover, for any (P, β, γ), each agent’s coherent perceptions are unique:
Proposition 5 (Coherent perceptions). Fix any (P, β, γ) with corresponding ANE sAN . For
each type θ, there exist unique coherent assortativity neglect perceptions P̂θ = F̂θ × F̂θ and ŝθ .
To see the idea, recall that in forming coherent perceptions, θ believes other agents to play
best-responses. Thus, any difference in the actions that θ attributes to two agents θ1 and θ2
might in principle be due to two channels—the difference in their types and the difference in
their local complementarity motives, which reflects their differing local action distributions:
ˆ
ŝθ (θ1 ) − ŝθ (θ2 ) = θ1 − θ2 + γ
| {z }
{z
}
|
|
∆(types)
∆(perceived actions)

ˆ
a dLŝθθ1 ,P̂θ (a)

−
{z

a dLŝθθ2 ,P̂θ (a)

∆(perceived local complementarity motives)
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.
}

Indeed, this reasoning is reminiscent of “information projection,” where agents mistakenly believe that others
have similar beliefs (Madarász, 2012).
20
This might capture a sense in which assortativity neglect can be an especially “persistent” misperception.
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However, the fact that θ’s perceived society P̂θ = F̂θ × F̂θ is non-assortative has the following
key implication: θ does not perceive any difference in θ1 and θ2 ’s complementarity motives,
as she believes all agents to face the same local action distribution. Thus, in explaining her
observed local action distribution, θ attributes all action dispersion to the type dispersion
among her matches. In other words, assortativity neglect leads to a form of misattribution that
is reminiscent of the “fundamental attribution error” documented in social psychology (Ross,
1977): θ attributes any variation in others’ behavior entirely to their intrinsic characteristics
(types), neglecting that external factors (e.g., differences in peer effects) might also be at play.21
Since, under assortativity neglect, θ’s perceived match distribution P̂θ (·|θ) coincides with
her perceived type distribution F̂θ in the overall population, the fact that she misattributes all
local action dispersion to type dispersion among her matches implies that


AN ,P

Lsθ

−1

 AN −1
(x) − Lsθ ,P
(y) = F̂θ−1 (x) − F̂θ−1 (y),

for all x, y ∈ (0, 1).

(11)

In Appendix B.6, we show that there is a unique F̂θ that achieves (11) while also ensuring that
θ is correct about the local action mean. The perceived strategy profile ŝθ is uniquely pinned
down by the perceived best-response condition.
Example 2. In Gaussian societies (Section 1.1), each agent θ’s perceived type distribution
F̂θ is also normal. In particular, (11) implies that θ’s perceived type variance equals her local
σ 2 (1−ρ2 )
AN 0
(θ )|θ], the perceived
action variance: σ̂θ2 = VarP [sAN (θ0 )|θ] = (1−(β+γ)ρ)
2 . Letting aθ := EP [s
0
0
best-response condition (10) implies that ŝθ (θ ) = θ + (β + γ)aθ for all θ0 . Finally, in order
for θ’s perceived local action mean EF̂θ [ŝθ (θ0 )] to match the true local action mean aθ , θ must
perceive the type mean to be µ̂θ = (1 − β − γ)aθ = µ + (1−β−γ)ρ(θ−µ)
.
N
1−(β+γ)ρ

4.3

Misperceptions about Type Distributions

Since Proposition 5 uniquely pins down each agent’s perceived type distribution, it provides a
lens through which to study how, under assortativity neglect, agents’ misperceptions of population characteristics are shaped by the nature of their social interactions. In particular, we
highlight the importance of strategic considerations: In our model, agents form perceptions
based on their matches’ behavior, which is subject to strategic motivations; as we show, this
leads to different predictions than under purely statistical misinference, where agents directly
observe their matches’ types and project them onto society.
In the following, for any environment (P, β, γ), we refer to agent θ’s coherent assortativity
neglect perception F̂θ simply as θ’s perceived type distribution.
21

Another source of the difference in θ1 and θ2 ’s actual ANE actions is the false consensus effect (i.e., their
different perceived global complementarity motives). This effect is also neglected by θ, who perceives everyone
to best-respond to the same global action distribution. Hence, an attribution error arises even if γ = 0.
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Perceived type dispersion. We first analyze agents’ perceptions of type dispersion in society (e.g., income inequality, political attitude polarization). The following result shows that
strategic complementarities drive up perceived type dispersion:
Proposition 6 (Perceived type dispersion). Fix any society P and type θ. If β1 +γ1 ≥ β2 +γ2 ,
then θ’s perceived type distribution F̂θ1 under (P, β1 , γ1 ) is more dispersive than θ’s perceived
type distribution F̂θ2 under (P, β2 , γ2 ).
Moreover, depending on the strength of β + γ, agents may under- or overestimate type
dispersion, as illustrated by the Gaussian example in Section 1.1. To see the idea, note that
our model generates two opposing errors in agents’ reasoning about type dispersion:
• First, a purely statistical error : Agents’ matches are on average less diverse than the
overall population.22 However, under assortativity neglect, agents believe their matches
to be representative of the overall population. This error pushes agents to underestimate
type dispersion.
• Second, an attribution error : Agents do not directly observe their matches’ types; instead, they draw inferences about the type distribution from their local action distributions. However, as discussed following Proposition 5, assortativity neglect leads agents to
misattribute all observed action dispersion to type dispersion, ignoring the fact that different types are also subject to different (local and/or perceived global) complementarity
motives. This pushes agents to overestimate type dispersion.
Without strategic complementarities (i.e., if β = γ = 0), only the statistical error channel is
relevant: In this case, agents’ actions sAN (θ) = θ match their types, so this setting is equivalent
to one where agents directly observe their local type distributions and project them onto society.
However, the stronger strategic complementarities, the more important is the attribution
error channel: By Proposition 4, an increase in β + γ increases ANE action dispersion (due
to stronger local complementarities and/or a stronger false consensus effect). Because of the
attribution error, this leads agents to perceive more type dispersion. When strategic complementarities are strong enough (relative to other parameters, such as the extent of assortativity),
then the attribution error channel can dominate, as illustrated by the Gaussian example.
Perceived type means. Second, we consider agents’ perceptions µ̂θ := EF̂θ [θ0 ] of the type
mean. The following result first notes that higher types θ perceive higher type means µ̂θ . That
is, the false consensus effect we observed for perceived behavior following Proposition 1 extends
to agents’ perceptions of the type mean. However, strategic complementarities counteract this
Indeed, by the law of total variance, any society P satisfies EF [VarP [θ0 |θ]] ≤ VarF [θ0 ]. More strongly, for
many parametric classes of societies (e.g., Gaussian), VarP [θ0 |θ] ≤ VarF [θ0 ] holds for all θ.
22
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effect, by reducing the sensitivity of µ̂θ to θ: The population distribution of perceived type
means µ̂θ (i.e., when θ is distributed according to F ) is less dispersed the greater β + γ.
Proposition 7 (Perceived type means). For any (P, β, γ), agents’ perceived type means µ̂θ are
increasing in their types θ. If β1 + γ1 ≥ β2 + γ2 , then the population distribution M 2 of perceived
type means under (P, β2 , γ2 ) is a mean-preserving spread of the distribution M 1 of perceived type
means under (P, β1 , γ1 ).
The false consensus effect reflects the statistical error underlying assortativity neglect: If
agents directly observe their local match distributions and project them onto society, the effect
is immediate, as µ̂θ coincides with θ’s expected match EP [θ1 |θ0 = θ], which is increasing in θ.
To see why strategic complementarities counteract this effect, recall that θ’s perceived type
mean satisfies µ̂θ = (1 − β − γ)EP [sAN (θ0 )|θ] (see Example 2). Thus, combined with the Markov
process representation of sAN in (8), we have
µ̂θ = (1 − β − γ)

∞
X

(β + γ)t EP [θt+1 |θ0 = θ].

(12)

t=0

That is, when θ draws inferences about the type distribution from her matches’ strategic behavior, then her perceived type mean µ̂θ depends not only on her immediate expected match
EP [θ1 |θ0 = θ], but also on her more distant t-step ahead expected matches, as the latter affect her immediate matches’ incentives. Moreover, the greater strategic complementarities, the
stronger is this dependence: increasing β + γ increases the weight on more distant expected
matches in (12). Importantly, as we show, θ’s more distant matches are less sensitive to her own
type than her immediate matches. Thus, stronger strategic complementarities lead perceived
type means µ̂θ to differ less across different agents θ.

4.4

Discussion

Misperceptions of income distributions. Several papers in economics and psychology have
put forward the aforementioned statistical error channel—individuals observe the incomes of
their social contacts and naively project these onto society—as a potential source of underestimation of income inequality (e.g., Cruces, Perez-Truglia, and Tetaz, 2013; Windsteiger, 2018;
Dawtry, Sutton, and Sibley, 2019).
However, underestimation of income inequality is not a universal empirical finding. Indeed,
the survey by Hauser and Norton (2017) notes: “Overall, the bulk of evidence suggests that
people around the world hold incorrect perceptions of inequality in their country—but with
variation. In the U.S. and United Kingdom, for example, underestimation of inequality is
relatively common, while overestimation occurs in other countries, such as France and Germany.
21

Moreover, there are a few exceptions of high accuracy: respondents in Norway, for instance,
were relatively accurate in estimating their country’s income inequality.” 23
The preceding analysis points to a novel channel that might contribute to such more mixed
findings: Rather than directly observing their social contacts’ incomes, individuals may need to
partly infer these from their consumption choices (e.g., education investment, or homes, cars,
and attire), which are subject to well-documented peer effects. If individuals neglect assortativity, we saw that this additionally generates an attribution error that counteracts the statistical
error. Depending on the relative strength of these errors, one may find underestimation, fairly
accurate perceptions, or overestimation of income inequality; specifically, our analysis predicts
that (ceteris paribus) overestimation is more likely in societies with stronger complementarity
motives and/or a lower degree of assortativity (see Figure 1). Establishing a conclusive empirical link between these factors and cross-country differences in perceived inequality is beyond the
scope of this paper, and various other forces (e.g., policy/ideological differences) likely also play
an important role. Nevertheless, while cross-country comparisons of complementarity motives
appear challenging,24 we note that socioeconomic segregation is well-documented to be higher
in the US/UK than in continental Europe (e.g., Musterd, 2005; Quillian and Lagrange, 2016);
thus, underestimation of inequality in the former countries and overestimation in the latter is
at least consistent with our predictions regarding the role of assortativity.
Importantly, people’s misperceptions of income distributions can have material consequences,
by influencing demand for redistribution: For instance, both empirical and theoretical work suggests that agents demand more redistribution if they perceive greater income inequality or a
lower own position θ− µ̂θ relative to the mean.25 Thus, by showing how these misperceptions are
shaped by agents’ social interactions, our findings in this section can also shed light on ways in
which the nature of social interactions (e.g., complementarity motives and assortativity) might
affect a society’s demand for redistribution.26
23

For example, Niehues (2014) compares perceived income distributions across 23 European countries and
the US and finds overestimation in most of continental Europe, relatively more accurate perceptions in several
Scandinavian countries, and underestimation in the US (e.g., her imputed subjective vs. actual Gini coefficients
include: Germany (0.35 vs. 0.29), France (0.36 vs. 0.3), Hungary (0.43 vs. 0.24), Czech Republic (0.38 vs. 0.25);
Norway (0.26 vs. 0.23); US (0.34 vs. 0.42)). Bavetta, Li Donni, and Marino (2019) similarly find overestimation
in Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, Finland, and South Korea, but underestimation in the US and UK.
24
However, one anti-conformism measure that has been employed in cross-country comparisons in economics
(e.g., Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011) and is known to correlate highly with anti-conformist behavior in lab
experiments (Bond and Smith, 1996) is Hofstede’s “individualism index” (Hofstede, 2001). This ranks the US (91
out of 100) and UK (89) among the least conformist countries and France (71) and Germany (67) as somewhat
more conformist (cf. https://www.hofstede-insights.com/product/compare-countries), consistent with
our prediction that overestimation of inequality is more likely in more conformist societies.
25
Empirical evidence includes Cruces, Perez-Truglia, and Tetaz (2013); Gimpelson and Treisman (2018);
Hvidberg, Kreiner, and Stantcheva (2021). These findings are consistent with replacing actual with perceived
income distributions in classic theoretical models of demand for redistribution.
26
A previous version of this paper (Frick, Iijima, and Ishii, 2019, Appendix E.2) illustrated this in the context
of Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) model of voting for redistribution.
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Misperceptions of political attitude distributions. Several recent studies document significant overestimation of political attitude polarization in the US: When asked to estimate
others’ (privately elicited) attitudes on various political issues, respondents perceive greater
than actual attitude dispersion on most issues, because they exaggerate the prevalence of extreme attitudes on both sides of the political spectrum.27
In addition to several other possible channels (e.g., media influence), the attribution error that our analysis highlights might also be relevant in this setting: Others’ privately held
attitudes are not directly observable, so people might partly infer these from the public manifestations of support they observe (e.g., social media posts, yard signs, or bumper stickers).
However, differences in such public manifestations may exceed differences in private attitudes,
as they may also be driven by catering to different peer groups. Neglecting this can contribute
to overestimating political attitude polarization, even when people’s observed samples are more
politically homogenous than the overall population.

5

Strategic Substitutes

Our results have focused on linear best-response games with strategic complementarities. However, the analysis can be extended to the case with global and/or local strategic substitutes
(i.e., β < 0 and/or γ < 0), which may be natural in some applications. The Markov process
representations (6) and (8) of Nash and ANE strategies are unchanged, as is the derivation of
coherent ANE perceptions. However, the directions of some effects change depending on the
sign of β, γ, and β + γ.
The following example illustrates this for Gaussian societies; Appendix C.3 presents the
general analysis, which involves some technical subtleties due to the fact that the terms in the
Markov process representations alternate signs across odd and even t.
Example 3. Consider global substitutes, β < 0. Nash and ANE strategies in a Gaussian society
P = (µ, σ 2 , ρ) take the same form as in Example 1. In particular, global action variances are still
2

2

1
1
σ 2 and Var(GAN ) = 1−(β+γ)ρ
σ 2 . Note that Var(GAN ) ≤ Var(GN E ).
Var(GN E ) = 1−γρ
Thus, in contrast with Proposition 1, assortativity neglect now decreases action dispersion.
This is because, under global substitutes, the false consensus effect of perceiving the global
action average to coincide with one’s local action average leads higher (lower) types to play
lower (higher) actions than under Nash.
27

E.g., the American National Election Survey elicits both citizens’ own attitudes and political affiliation and
their estimates of average attitudes among typical Democrats and Republicans on a wide range of issues. On
average, the actual difference between Democrats and Republicans is 1 point (on a 7 point scale), but perceived
differences are almost twice as large; perceptions vary with own political affiliation, but most respondents
exaggerate the extremeness of attitudes on both sides (cf. Bordalo, Tabellini, and Yang, 2021; Bordalo, Coffman,
Gennaioli, and Shleifer, 2016). See also Ahler (2014); Westfall, Van Boven, Chambers, and Judd (2015).
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The effect of increased assortativity depends additionally on the local complementarity
parameter γ. If γ < 0, the multiplier effect in Proposition 2 holds with a flipped sign: Both
Var(GN E ) and Var(GAN ) are decreasing in ρ, but the derivative is more negative under ANE.
In contrast, if γ > 0, then increasing ρ can have opposite effects on Nash and ANE: Nash action
dispersion always increases, but ANE action dispersion decreases if β + γ < 0.
σ 2 (1−ρ2 )
Finally, as in Example 2, agents’ (coherent) perception of type variance is σ̂θ2 = (1−(β+γ)ρ)
2,
2
which under-/overestimates the true variance σ when β + γ is small/large relative to ρ. If
β+γ < 0, only underestimation is possible, as the statistical and attribution errors in Section 4.3
now push in the same direction.
N

6

Concluding Remarks

6.1

Related Literature

This paper contributes to a growing literature in behavioral game theory that studies the steadystate behavior of players who draw misinferences from the observational feedback generated by
their game. While in our setting agents neglect selection effects arising from the assortativity
of social interactions, a number of papers consider agents who neglect selection due to missing
feedback about non-implemented projects/transactions, e.g., in settings of adverse selection
(Esponda, 2008), voting (Esponda and Pouzo, 2017), or investment (Jehiel, 2018).28 A related
inferential bias, correlation neglect, underlies cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin, 2005) and
analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel, 2005; Jehiel and Koessler, 2008): Here, agents
are correct about the marginal distributions of opponents’ actions and types, but misperceive
the correlation between these two;29 these solution concepts reduce to Nash equilibrium in the
static private-value environment of this paper. Chauvin (2018) studies an equilibrium model of
discrimination: Agents belong to observable groups whose outcome distributions depend jointly
on members’ individual traits and on population beliefs about the group, but others’ beliefs
about each group are based on the misinference that observed outcomes are purely due to
members’ traits. This misinference is similar in spirit to the fundamental attribution error that
we derive from agents’ assortativity neglect in Section 4.2.30 ANE (and most aforementioned
settings) can be seen as instances of Berk-Nash equilibrium (Esponda and Pouzo, 2016), which
28

Like these papers, we consider agents whose samples are biased but infinite. In Osborne and Rubinstein
(1998, 2003); Salant and Cherry (2020); Gonçalves (2020), agents observe unbiased but finite samples.
29
Relatedly, Spiegler (2016, 2017) considers an agent who infers an incorrect joint distribution over multiple
observed economic variables by misperceiving causal relations. The implications of selection/correlation neglect
have also been explored in settings without equilibrium feedback (e.g., Streufert, 2000; Glaeser and Sunstein,
2009; Ortoleva and Snowberg, 2015; Levy and Razin, 2015; Ellis and Piccione, 2017).
30
See Kaneko and Matsui (1999) for a related model of discrimination based on inductive game theory.
Ettinger and Jehiel (2010) formalize a form of fundamental attribution error in a bargaining setting.
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captures the steady-state behavior of players with general misspecified models of the feedback
structure of their game.
Different from the aforementioned papers, Section 4 also considers how players can “rationalize” their observed action distributions as resulting from optimal behavior, by forming
coherent misperceptions about the type distribution and strategy profile. This exercise relates to the literature on rationalizable conjectural equilibrium (e.g., Rubinstein and Wolinsky,
1994; Esponda, 2013; Fudenberg and Kamada, 2015; Lipnowski and Sadler, 2019). This refines self-confirming equilibrium (Fudenberg and Levine, 1993; Battigalli, 1987) by requiring
that agents’ beliefs about opponents’ behavior are not only consistent with their observational
feedback, but are also consistent with opponents best-responding to beliefs that are themselves
observationally consistent (and similarly for higher-order beliefs). Whereas these papers consider standard agents who do not ex-ante rule out the correct observational feedback structure,
we consider misspecified agents who reason based on the dogmatic misperception that society
is non-assortative (see also Remark 2 and Appendix C.1).
While we analyze the equilibrium implications of assortativity neglect for population games
in fixed societies, other recent papers consider the effect of related selection biases on endogenous
sorting. Levy and Razin (2017) study the coevolution of sorting into different school types
and beliefs about school quality: agents’ beliefs are shaped by communicating with school
peers while ignoring selection into schools. They characterize when polarized beliefs about
school quality are sustained in the long run. Windsteiger (2018) considers steady-state sorting
into social classes when agents directly observe their peers’ incomes but underestimate income
differences across classes; she shows that this misperception reduces demand for redistribution.
As noted, assortativity neglect can be seen as a form of projection bias. Other work has
studied strategic interactions under different forms of projection bias, for example, when agents
project their tastes onto others (e.g., Breitmoser, 2019; Gagnon-Bartsch, Pagnozzi, and Rosato,
2021; Gagnon-Bartsch, 2017; Bohren and Hauser, 2021, in the context of auctions and social
learning) or when agents overestimate the similarity of others’ signals (Madarász, 2012, 2016).
Linear best-response games are also widely studied in the literature on network games. Two
recent papers relate to our focus on agents’ misperceptions of interaction patterns: Battigalli,
Panebianco, and Pin (2020) study self-confirming equilibrium in network games, with a focus on learning dynamics and perceived centrality. Jackson (2019) studies implications of the
“friendship paradox,” i.e., the fact that people’s neighbors on average have higher degrees than
themselves. He shows that, because of this, if agents naively behave as in the local interaction
case even though utilities depend on uniform global interactions, then, under strategic complementarities, this leads to higher average behavior than Nash. Our setting does not feature
degree heterogeneity, so centrality/the friendship paradox play no role; instead, we focus on
misperceptions of assortativity based on type heterogeneity. Our analysis of agents’ coherent
25

misperceptions also has no counterpart in these papers.
Finally, in incomplete-information games, Samet (1998) introduced the use of Markov processes to represent players’ higher-order beliefs about the uncertain fundamental. Golub and
Morris (2018) study incomplete-information games on networks, in which case the corresponding
Markov process depends on both the signal structure and network; with linear best-responses,
Bayes-Nash equilibria can then be written as discounted sums of the higher-order expectations of this process.31 While we consider population games without aggregate uncertainty, our
Markov process over t-step ahead matches can be seen as an analog of the Markov processes
over higher-order beliefs in those papers. The key novelty is that, due to the assortativity
of P , our Markov process is monotone. Monotonicity plays a central role for our analysis of
action dispersion (and perceived type distributions), by allowing us to translate comparisons of
interaction structures/type distributions into comparisons of the distributions of t-step ahead
expected matches. Beyond games with assortative interactions, our proof methods may also
be useful in incomplete-information linear best-response games (e.g., beauty contests) where
the signal structure displays appropriate positive correlation to ensure monotonicity of the
corresponding Markov process.

6.2

Conclusion

We propose a model of social interactions and misperceptions under assortativity neglect. To
analyze the interplay between assortativity neglect and agents’ strategic incentives, we define
an equilibrium notion where agents best-respond to the misperception that the local action
distributions among their peers are representative of behavior in society. We also model how
agents form misperceptions about the type distribution from their local action observations, by
reasoning about their peers’ incentives through the lens of their assortativity neglect. Based
on this, we show how, when combined with strategic complementarities, assortativity neglect
increases action dispersion in society. We also find that assortativity neglect generates two
countervailing mistakes in agents’ inferences about the type distribution—a statistical and an
attribution error. Depending on the nature of social interactions, this may lead agents to
either under- or overestimate type dispersion. We discuss the relevance of our results in the
context of socioeconomic disparities in education investment, as well as empirically documented
misperceptions of income inequality and political attitude polarization.
Beyond the class of population games considered in this paper, future work might explore the
implications of assortativity neglect for behavior and misperceptions in games with aggregate
uncertainty (e.g., financial markets) or in dynamic settings (e.g., social learning; see Section 7.1
31

A discounted-sum expression of equilibrium actions also appears in Morris and Shin (2002), although their
analysis is focused on Gaussian information structures and does not make a connection with Markov processes.
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of Frick, Iijima, and Ishii, 2020).

Appendix
Proofs for Appendix A and C are in Online Appendix D.1 and D.2, respectively.

A

Preliminaries

A.1

Operator TC induced by interaction structure C

Many of our proofs will make use of a particular operator TC over the the space of inverse cdfs
that is induced by any interaction structure C. Let L1 be the space of all measurable functions
´1
f : (0, 1) → R such that 0 |f (x)|dx < ∞, endowed with the L1 norm. Let I ⊆ L1 denote
the subset consisting of weakly increasing and absolutely continuous functions.32 For each cdf
´1
F ∈ F, we have that F −1 is strictly increasing, absolutely continuous and that 0 |F −1 (x)|dx =
´
|θ|dF (θ) < ∞, so F −1 ∈ I. Conversely, for any strictly increasing f ∈ I, we have f −1 ∈ F.
Given any interaction structure C, define the operator TC over L1 by
ˆ1
TC f (x) =

f (y) dC(y|x)
0

´1
for all f ∈ L1 . If C ∈ C with density c, then TC f (x) = 0 c(y, x)f (y)dy for all f ∈ L1 . The
following lemma records basic properties of TC that we invoke without reference from now on:
Lemma A.1. Fix any C ∈ C. Then TC is a continuous operator from L1 to L1 with the
following properties:
1. kTC f k ≤ kf k for each f ∈ L1 .
2. TC f ∈ I for any f ∈ I.
3. For any γ ∈ (−1, 1) and f ∈ L1 ,
lim

τ →∞

τ
X

t

t

γ (TC ) f =

t=0

∞
X

γ t (TC )t f ∈ L1 ,

t=0

where (TC )t is defined by (TC )0 (f ) := f and (TC )t+1 (f ) := (TC )t (TC f ) for all f and t.
32

That is, for any x, x0 ∈ (0, 1), there is an integrable function f 0 such that f (x) = f (x0 ) +
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´x

x0

f 0 (y)dy.

A.2

Mean-preserving spread and dispersiveness orders over I

´1
´1
Define a binary relation %m over I by setting f %m g if and only if 0 φ(f (x))dx ≥ 0 φ(g(x))dx
for all convex functions φ such that φ ◦ f, φ ◦ g ∈ L1 . Note that for F , G ∈ F, F is a meanpreserving spread of G if and only if F −1 %m G−1 . The following characterization of %m is
standard (for the proof, see Section 3.A.1 in Shaked and Shanthikumar, 2007):
´1
´1
Lemma A.2. Let f, g ∈ I. Then f %m g, if and only if, y f (x)dx ≥ y g(x)dx holds for all
y ∈ (0, 1) and holds with equality when y = 0.
Define binary relation %d over I by f %d g if and only if f (x) − f (x0 ) ≥ g(x) − g(x0 ) for all
x, x0 ∈ (0, 1) with x ≥ x0 . For F, G ∈ F, F is more dispersive than G if and only if F −1 %d G−1 .
We say that a preorder (i.e., reflexive and transitive binary relation) % over I is linear if for
any f, g, h ∈ I and α1 , α2 > 0, we have f % g if and only if α1 f + α2 h % α1 g + α2 h; continuous
if for any fn → f ∈ I, gn → g ∈ I with fn % gn for each n, we have f % g; and isotone if
f % g implies TC f % TC g for any C ∈ C. Orders %m and %d satisfies these properties:
Lemma A.3. %m and %d are preorders over I that are linear, continuous, and isotone.
Finally, we show that (TC )t f is %m -decreasing in t:
Lemma A.4. (TC )t f %m (TC )t+1 f for all t ≥ 0, C ∈ C and f ∈ I.

B
B.1

Main Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1

Write P = (F, C) and µ := EF [θ]. Since F ∈ F, F −1 ∈ I with F −1 strictly increasing. Define
h(x) :=

X

γ t (TC )t F −1 (x) +

t≥0

βµ
(1 − γ)(1 − β − γ)

for each x ∈ (0, 1). Note that, by construction, h = F −1 + βTCI h + γTC h, where CI (x, y) =
xy denotes the non-assortative interaction structure. Moreover, h is strictly increasing, since
(TC )t F −1 is weakly increasing for each t ≥ 0 and strictly increasing for t = 0. Note also that for
each t, (TC )t F −1 ∈ I and hence there exists (TCt F −1 )0 : (0, 1) → R+ such that (TC )t F −1 (x) −
´x
(TC )t F −1 (x0 ) = x0 (TCt F −1 )0 (y)dy for all x > x0 . Thus, h is absolutely continuous as
P ´x
h(x) − h(x0 ) = limτ →∞ τt=0 x0 γ t (TCt F −1 )0 (y)dy
´xP
´xP
= limτ →∞ x0 τt=0 γ t (TCt F −1 )0 (y)dy = x0 t≥0 γ t (TCt F −1 )0 (y)dy,
where the last equality holds by the monotone convergence theorem.
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´
´
Let s(θ) := h(F (θ)) for each θ ∈ Θ. Since h ∈ L1 , we have |s(θ)|dF (θ) = |h(x)|dx < ∞.
Moreover, s inherits strict monotonicity and absolute continuity (by the change of variable
theorem) from h and F . Finally, s is a Nash equilibrium because for each type θ and x = F (θ),
we have s(θ) = h(x) = F −1 (x) + βTCI h(x) + γTC h(x) = θ + βEF [s(θ0 )] + γEP [s(θ0 ) | θ].
To show uniqueness of equilibrium, consider any Nash equilibrium ŝ. Define ĥ(x) :=
ŝ(F −1 (x)) for each x. By the best-response condition for ŝ, we have
ĥ = F −1 + βTCI ĥ + γTC ĥ.

(13)

Iterating (13) yields


ĥ = F −1 + βTCI ĥ + γTC F −1 + βTCI ĥ + γ 2 (TC )2 ĥ = . . .
=

τ
X



γ t (TC )t F −1 + βTCI ĥ + γ τ +1 (TC )τ +1 ĥ

t=0

for all τ ∈ N. The analogous iteration holds for h. Thus,
kĥ − hk ≤ k
≤k

τ
X
t=0
τ
X



γ t (TC )t F −1 − βTCI ĥ − F −1 + βTCI h k + γ τ +1 k(TC )τ +1 (ĥ − h)k
t

t

γ (TC )




βTCI (h − ĥ) k + γ τ +1 kĥ − hk,

t=0

P∞

t

t





βTCI (h − ĥ) k as τ → ∞. But integrating both sides of
´1
µ
(13) with respect to x, we obtain 0 ĥ(x)dx = TCI ĥ(y) = 1−β−γ
for each y, and analogously
µ
TCI h(y) = 1−β−γ from the best-response condition for h. Thus, kĥ − hk = 0, whence ŝ = s.
which converges to k

B.2

t=0

γ (TC )

Proof of Proposition 1

Fix any (P, β, γ). By the best-response condition (7), any ANE sAN is the Nash equilibrium at
(P, β 0 , γ 0 ), where β 0 = 0, γ 0 = β + γ. Thus, by Lemma 1, sAN is uniquely given by (8).
To show that the ANE global action distribution GAN is more dispersive than the Nash
distribution GN E , it suffices to show that sAN (θ) − sAN (θ0 ) ≥ sN E (θ) − sN E (θ0 ) for all θ > θ0 .
To show this, note that for all τ ,
0≤

τ
X
((γ + β)t − γ t ) (EP [θt |θ0 = θ] − EP [θt |θ0 = θ0 ]) ,
t=0

as the monotonicity of process P implies EP [θt |θ0 = θ] ≥ EP [θt |θ0 = θ0 ] for all t. By (6) and
(8), the RHS converges to (sAN (θ) − sAN (θ0 )) − (sN E (θ) − sN E (θ0 )) as τ → ∞.
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B.3

Proof of Proposition 2

Let %M A denote the more-assortative order over C. We first show that %M A is the “dual order”
of the mean-preserving spread order %m :
Lemma B.1. Fix any C1 , C2 ∈ C. Then C1 %M A C2 if and only if TC1 F −1 %m TC2 F −1 for all
F ∈ F.
Proof. First, observe that C1 %M A C2 if and only if C1 (·|x ≥ y) first-order stochastically
dominates C2 (· | x ≥ y) for any y ∈ (0, 1). This is because
ˆ
C 1 %M A C 2

z

ˆ

ˆ

y
0

ˆ

y

c2 (x0 , x)dxdx0 ∀y, z ∈ (0, 1)

c1 (x , x)dxdx ≥

⇐⇒

ˆ0 z ˆ0 1

ˆ0 z ˆ0 1
c1 (x0 , x)dxdx0 ≤

⇐⇒
0

⇐⇒

z

0

y

c2 (x0 , x)dxdx0 ∀y, z ∈ (0, 1)
0

y

C1 (z | x ≥ y) ≤ C2 (z | x ≥ y) ∀y, z ∈ (0, 1),

´z´1
´1´z
where the second line uses 0 0 ci (x0 , x)dxdx0 = 0 0 ci (x0 , x)dx0 dx = z for each i = 1, 2.
´1
Next, note that for any F ∈ F, we have TC1 F −1 %m TC2 F −1 if and only if y TC1 f (x)dx ≥
´1
T f (x)dx for all y ∈ (0, 1) with equality if y = 0. But
y C2
´1

⇐⇒
⇐⇒

TC1 f (x)dx ≥

´1

T f (x)dx, ∀y ∈ (0, 1)
y C2
´
´
1 1
c (x0 , x)f (x0 )dx0 dx ≥ y 0 c2 (x0 , x)f (x0 )dx0 dx, ∀y ∈ (0, 1)
y 0 1
´1´1 1
´1´1 1
0
0
0
c
(x
,
x)dxf
(x
)dx
≥
c (x0 , x)dxf (x0 )dx0 , ∀y ∈ (0, 1).
1
0 y 1−y 2
0 y 1−y
´1´1

y

Since the set of all F −1 with F ∈ F consists of all L1 , strictly increasing and absolutely
continuous functions on (0, 1), this implies that TC1 F −1 %m TC2 F −1 holds for all F ∈ F if and
only if C1 (· | x ≥ y) first-order stochastically dominates C2 (· | x ≥ y) for any y ∈ (0, 1). By the
first paragraph, this is equivalent to C1 %M A C2 .
Proof of Proposition 2. (1.) ⇒ (2.): Suppose that C1 %M A C2 and consider any F, β, γ.
Let f := F −1 , which is in I since F ∈ F. We first show by induction that (TC1 )t f %m (TC2 )t f
for all t. For t = 1, this is true by Lemma B.1. Suppose the claim holds for some t ≥ 1. Then
(TC1 )t+1 f = TC1 (TC1 )t f %m TC1 (TC2 )t f %m TC2 (TC2 )t f = (TC2 )t+1 f,
where the first comparison follows from the inductive hypothesis by isotonicity of %m , and the
second one holds by Lemma B.1. Thus, by transitivity of %m , we have (TC1 )t+1 f %m (TC2 )t+1 f .
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Next, note that linearity of %m and C1 %M A C2 implies
τ
X

γ t (TC1 )t F −1 %m

γ τ (TC2 )τ +

τ −1
X

t=0
τ
X

%m

t

t

γ t (TC1 )t F −1

t=0

γ (TC2 ) +

t=τ −1

!

τ −2
X

!
t

t

F

γ (TC1 )

−1

%m · · · %m

τ
X

γ t (TC2 )t F −1

t=0

t=0

for any τ ∈ N. Moreover, by Lemma A.1, as τ → ∞, we have
τ
X

t

t

γ (TC1 ) F

−1

→

t=0

∞
X

t

t

γ (TC1 ) F

−1

,

τ
X

t=0

t

t

γ (TC2 ) F

−1

→

t=0

∞
X

γ t (TC2 )t F −1 .

t=0

Thus, by continuity and linearity of %m , we have
∞
X

t

t

γ (TC1 ) F

−1

t=0

∞
X
βµ
βµ
+
%m
γ t (TC2 )t F −1 +
,
(1 − γ)(1 − β − γ)
(1 − γ)(1 − β − γ)
t=0

E
E
where µ = EF [θ]. Thus, GN
is a mean-preserving spread of GN
at (F, β, γ).
1
2
AN
(2.) ⇒ (3.): Immediate from the fact that G at (P, β, γ) coincides with GN E at (P, 0, β +γ).
(3.) ⇒ (1.): Let gF,Ci ,β,γ denote the inverse of the ANE global action distribution at (F, Ci , β, γ).
Suppose gF,C1 ,β,γ %m gF,C2 ,β,γ for all (F, β, γ). Setting f := F −1 and δ := β + γ, we have

X

δ t (TC1 )t f = gF,C1 ,β,γ %m gF,C2 ,β,γ =

X

t≥0

δ t (TC2 )t f.

t≥0

By linearity of %m and since (TCi )0 (f ) = f for i = 1, 2, this implies
TC1 f +

X

δ t−1 (TC1 )t f %m TC2 f +

t≥2

X

δ t−1 (TC2 )t f.

(14)

t≥2

Note that for each i = 1, 2,
kTCi f +

X

δ t−1 (TCi )t f − TCi f k ≤

t≥2

X
t≥2

δ t−1 k(TCi )t f k ≤

X

δ t−1 kf k.

t≥2

P
Hence, as δ → 0, TCi f + t≥2 δ t−1 (TCi )t f → TCi f . Thus, by continuity of %m , (14) yields
TC1 f % TC2 f . As this is true for all f = F −1 , we have C1 %M A C2 by Lemma B.1.
(1.) ⇔ (4.): We first show that (1.) implies (4.). By the proof of “(1.) ⇒ (2.),” we have
(TC1 )t F −1 %m (TC2 )t F −1 for all t. Thus,


(β + γ)t (TC1 )t + γ t (TC2 )t F −1 %m γ t (TC1 )t + (β + γ)t (TC2 )t F −1 ,
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as (β + γ)t ≥ γ t ≥ 0 and by linearity of %m . Then linearity and continuity of %m also imply
P∞

t=0

%m

((β + γ)t (TC1 )t + γ t (TC2 )t ) F −1 +

P∞

t=0

βEF [θ]
(1−γ)(1−β−γ)

(γ t (TC1 )t + (β + γ)t (TC2 )t ) F −1 +

βEF [θ]
.
(1−γ)(1−β−γ)

By monotonicity of equilibrium strategies, this yields for all θ∗ that
NE
∗
NE
AN
∗
EF [sAN
1 (θ) + s2 (θ)|θ ≥ θ ] ≥ EF [s1 (θ) + s2 (θ)|θ ≥ θ ],

which is equivalent to the first inequality in part (4.). The second inequality follows from part
(2.), which is implied by part (1.) as we showed above. Finally, to see that (4.) implies (1.), note
that the second inequality in (4.) implies (2.). Thus, (1.) follows from the above proofs.

B.4

Proof of Proposition 3

(1.) ⇒ (2.): Take any F1 , F2 ∈ F such that F1 is more dispersive than F2 . Then F1−1 %d F2−1 .
First, we inductively show that for each t, (TC )t F1−1 %d (TC )t F2−1 . Indeed, supposing that the
claim is true at t, isotonicity of %d implies
(TC )t+1 F1−1 = TC (TC )t F1−1 %d TC (TC )t F2−1 = (TC )t+1 F2−1 ,
P
Pτ
t
t −1
as required. Next, since %d is linear, we have τt=0 γ t (TC )t F1−1 %d
for all
t=0 γ (TC ) F2
P
Pτ
∞
t
t −1
t
t −1
τ ∈ N. Since limτ →∞ t=0 γ (TC ) Fi = t=0 γ (TC ) Fi for each i = 1, 2 and any γ ∈ [0, 1),
continuity and linearity of %d then yields
E −1
(GN
=
1 )

X

γ t (TC )t F1−1 +

t≥0

X
βEF2 [θ]
βEF1 [θ]
E −1
%d
γ t (TC )t F2−1 +
= (GN
2 ) ,
(1 − γ)(1 − β − γ)
(1
−
γ)(1
−
β
−
γ)
t≥0

E
E
is more dispersive than GN
whence GN
1
2 .
(2.) ⇒ (3.): Immediate from the fact that GAN at (P, β, γ) coincides with GN E at (P, 0, β +γ).
(3.) ⇒ (1.): Immediate from the fact that GAN at (P, 0, 0) coincides with F .
(1.) ⇔ (4.): To see that (1.) implies (4.), note that, for any x > x0 ,



−1
AN −1 0
N E −1
N E −1 0
(GAN
1 ) (x) − (G1 ) (x ) − (G1 ) (x) − (G1 ) (x )
X


=
(γ + β)t − γ t (TC )t F1−1 (x) − (TC )t F1−1 (x0 )
t≥0

≥

X

(γ + β)t − γ t




(TC )t F2−1 (x) − (TC )t F2−1 (x0 )

t≥0

=



−1
AN −1 0
N E −1
N E −1 0
(GAN
2 ) (x) − (G2 ) (x ) − (G2 ) (x) − (G2 ) (x ) .
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Here the inequality holds since by the proof of “(1.) ⇒ (2.),” we have (TC )t F1−1 %d (TC )t F2−1 .
This establishes the first inequality in (4.). The second inequality in (4.) holds by the fact that
(1.) implies (2.), as shown above. Finally, to see that (4.) implies (1.), note that the second
inequality in (4.) implies (2.). Thus, (1.) follows from the above proofs.

B.5

Proof of Proposition 4

We only consider ANE; the proof for Nash is analogous. Suppose β1 + γ1 ≥ β2 + γ2 . For any
P
at (F, C, βi , γi ). Then gi = t≥0 (βi + γi )t (TC )t f ,
(F, C), consider the inverse cdf gi of GAN
i
P
where f = F −1 . Observe that (β1 + γ1 )t (TC )t f %d (β2 + γ2 )t (TC )t f for all t. Thus, τt≥0 (β1 +
P
γ1 )t (TC )t f %d τt≥0 (β2 +γ2 )t (TC )t f for all τ ≥ 0 by linearity of %d . Then by continuity of %d , it
is more dispersive than GAN
follows that g1 %d g2 , whence GAN
2 . Conversely, if β1 +γ1 < β2 +γ2 ,
1
the same argument implies g2 d g1 for any (F, C) with C 6= CI .

B.6

Proof of Proposition 5
AN

We first verify that Lsθ ,P ∈ F for each θ. By Proposition 1, (sAN )−1 is strictly increasing
AN
and absolutely continuous. By monotonicity of sAN , Lsθ ,P (a) = P ((sAN )−1 (a)|θ) for each a ∈
AN
sAN (Θ). Since P (θ0 |θ) is absolutely continuous and strictly increasing in θ0 on Θ, Lsθ ,P (a) is
absolutely continuous (by the change of variable theorem) and strictly increasing in a ∈ sAN (Θ).
´ ´ AN 0
´
Moreover, since sAN is L1 with respect to F ,
|s (θ )|dP (θ0 |θ)dF (θ) = |sAN (θ)|dF (θ) <
∞. Thus, there exists Θ∗ ⊆ Θ such that Θ\Θ∗ has Lebesgue measure zero and for every θ ∈ Θ∗ ,
´ AN 0
AN
AN
|s (θ )|dP (θ0 |θ) < ∞. Hence, Lsθ ,P is L1 for all θ ∈ Θ∗ . As Lsθ ,P is FOSD-monotonic in
AN
θ, this implies that Lsθ ,P is L1 for every θ ∈ Θ.33
Define a type distribution F̂θ by
ˆ
AN
sAN ,P −1
−1
F̂θ (x) = (Lθ
) (x) − (β + γ) (Lsθ ,P )−1 (z)dz
(15)
AN

for each x. Since Lsθ ,P ∈ F, it follows that F̂θ−1 is L1 , strictly increasing, and absolutely
continuous, so F̂θ ∈ F. Let P̂θ := F̂θ × F̂θ and let ŝθ be the Nash equilibrium at (P̂θ , β, γ).
Then ŝθ (θ0 ) = BRθ0 (Gŝθ ,P̂θ , Lŝθθ0 ,P̂θ ) for each θ0 ∈ suppF̂θ , so the perceived best-response condition
´
AN
Indeed, take any θ ∈ Θ\Θ∗ . If θ ∈ (inf Θ, sup Θ), pick θ0 , θ00 ∈ Θ∗ with θ0 < θ < θ00 . Then |a|dLsθ ,P (a) =
´∞
´0
´∞
´0
AN
AN
AN
AN
− −∞ adLsθ ,P (a) + 0 adLsθ ,P (a) ≤ − −∞ adLθs0 ,P (a) + 0 adLθs00 ,P (a) < ∞. If θ = sup Θ (the case
´
´0
AN
AN
AN
θ = inf Θ is analogous), then suppLsθ ,P is bounded above. Thus, |a|dLθs ,P (a) = − −∞ adLsθ ,P (a) +
´∞
´0
´∞
AN
AN
AN
adLsθ ,P (a) ≤ − −∞ adLsθ0 ,P (a) + 0 adLθs ,P (a) < ∞ for any θ0 ∈ Θ∗ .
0
33

33

holds. Moreover, for each x,
ˆ
(Lθŝθ ,P̂θ )−1 (x)

(Lŝθθ ,P̂θ )−1 (z)dz
ˆ 

sAN ,P −1
ŝθ ,P̂θ −1
sAN ,P −1
) (z) dz,
(Lθ ) (z) − (Lθ
= (Lθ
) (x) + (β + γ)
F̂θ−1 (x)

=

+ (β + γ)

where the first equality uses the perceived best-response condition and P̂θ = F̂θ × F̂θ , and the
AN
second equality uses (15). Integrating both sides with respect to x yields Lŝθθ ,P̂θ = Lsθ ,P , verifying observational consistency. Thus, (P̂θ , ŝθ ) are coherent assortativity neglect perceptions.
Conversely, for any coherent assortativity neglect perceptions (P̂θ = F̂θ × F̂θ , ŝθ ), observational
consistency and perceived best-response imply (15), ensuring the uniqueness of F̂θ . Moreover,
by the perceived best-response condition, ŝθ is the unique Nash equilibrium at (P̂θ , β, γ).

B.7

Proof of Proposition 6

Write P = (F, C). Let si and (P̂θi = F̂θi × F̂θi , ŝiθ ) denote the ANE strategy profile and θ’s
coherent assortativity neglect perceptions at (P, βi , γi ) for i = 1, 2. Suppose β1 + γ1 ≥ β2 + γ2 .
For any x, y ∈ (0, 1) with x > y, we have
ŝi ,P̂ i

ŝi ,P̂ i

(F̂θi )−1 (x) − (F̂θi )−1 (y) = (Lθθ θ )−1 (x) − (Lθθ θ )−1 (y)
P
i
i
= (Lsθ ,P )−1 (x) − (Lsθ ,P )−1 (y) = t≥0 (βi + γi )t ((TC )t F −1 (x0 ) − (TC )t F −1 (y 0 )) ,
where x0 , y 0 ∈ (0, 1) with x0 > y 0 are defined by C(x0 | F −1 (θ)) = x and C(y 0 | F −1 (θ)) = y.
Indeed, the first equality holds by the perceived best-response condition, the second equality by
observational consistency, and the final one by construction of ANE strategies. Since (β1 +γ1 )t ≥
(β2 + γ2 )t and (TC )t F −1 (x0 ) − (TC )t F −1 (y 0 ) ≥ 0 for all t, it follows that (F̂θ1 )−1 (x) − (F̂θ1 )−1 (y) ≥
(F̂θ2 )−1 (x) − (F̂θ2 )−1 (y). Thus, F̂θ1 is more dispersive than F̂θ2 .

B.8

Proof of Proposition 7

Write P = (F, C). Let f := F −1 and ηi := βi +γi for each i = 1, 2. Since the local action average
P
observed by each type quantile x under the ANE at (P, βi , γi ) is given by t≥0 ηit (TC )t+1 f (x),
P
we have (M i )−1 = (1 − ηi ) t≥0 ηit (TC )t+1 f . For each τ ≥ 0, we show
1

τ
X

Pτ

t
t=0 η2

η2t (TC )t+1 f

%m Pτ

1

t
t=0 η1

t=0
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τ
X
t=0

η1t (TC )t+1 f.

(16)

For τ = 0, there is nothing to prove. Supposing the claim holds for some τ ≥ 0, we have
!
Pτ
τ
t
X
η
η2τ +1
1
t
t+1
t
t+1
t=0 2
P
η
(T
)
f
=
η
(T
)
f
+
Pτ +1 t
Pτ +1 t
Pτ +1 t (TC )τ +2 f
τ
2 C
2 C
t
η
t=0 2 t=0
t=0 η2 t=0
t=0 η2
t=0 η2
!
Pτ
τ
X
η2t
1
η2τ +1
t
t+1
P
η
(T
)
f
+
%m Pτt=0
Pτ +1 t (TC )τ +2 f
τ
1 C
+1 t
t
η
t=0 1 t=0
t=0 η2
t=0 η2
!
Pτ
τ
τ +1
t
X
X
1
η1τ +1
1
t
t+1
τ +2
t=0 η1
P
η
(T
)
f
+
η1t (TC )t+1 f,
(T
)
f
=
Pτ +1 t
Pτ +1 t C
Pτ +1 t
τ
1 C
t
η
t=0 1 t=0
t=0 η1
t=0 η1
t=0 η1 t=0
1

%m

τ +1
X

as required. Here the first dominance holds by inductive hypothesis and the
second P
dominance
Pτ
τ
η2t
η1t
t=0
follows from linearity of %m along with the fact that η1 ≥ η2 (so that Pτ +1 ηt ≤ Pτt=0
+1 t and
η
η τ +1
Pτ1+1 t
t=0 η1

η τ +1
Pτ2+1 t )
t=0 η2

t=0

t+1

1

t=0

2

τ +2

≥
and that (TC ) f %m (TC ) f for all t ≤ τ + 1 (by Lemma A.4).
P
Taking τ → ∞ in (16), continuity of %m then yields (1 − η2 ) t≥0 η2t (TC )t+1 f %m (1 −
P
η1 ) t≥0 η1t (TC )t+1 f , i.e., (M 2 )−1 %m (M 1 )−1 , as claimed.

C

Extensions

C.1

Generalization of coherent assortativity neglect perceptions

Definition 3 assumes that θ perceives all other agents θ0 to share her perceptions P̂θ and ŝθ . Expanding on Remark 2, we show that this assumption is not essential for our results. Specifically,
suppose that we enrich type θ’s coherent assortativity neglect perceptions to consist of:
• Own perceptions: θ’s own perception of a non-assortative society P̂θ = F̂θ × F̂θ and
perceived strategy profile ŝθ ;
• Perceptions about others’ perceptions: for each type θ0 , θ’s perception of θ0 ’s perceived
non-assortative society P̂θ,θ0 = F̂θ,θ0 × F̂θ,θ0 and θ’s perception of θ0 ’s perceived strategy
profile ŝθ,θ0 ;
subject to three requirements:
AN ,P

1. Observational consistency: Lθs

= Lŝθθ ,P̂θ ;
ŝ

2. Perceived best-response: for each θ0 , ŝθ (θ0 ) ∈ BRθ0 (Gŝθ,θ0 ,P̂θ,θ0 , Lθθ,θ
0
ŝ

3. Perceived observational consistency: for each θ0 , Lŝθθ0 ,P̂θ = Lθθ,θ
0

0 ,P̂θ,θ 0

0 ,P̂θ,θ 0

);

.

The first condition is the same observational consistency requirement as in Definition 3. The
second condition still says that θ perceives θ0 to play a best-response; however, in rationalizing
θ0 ’s behavior, θ now allows that θ0 ’s perceived society and strategy profile might be different from
35

her own. Finally, the third condition requires the perceptions P̂θ,θ0 and ŝθ,θ0 that θ attributes
to θ0 to be consistent with the local action distribution Lŝθθ0 ,P̂θ that she perceives θ0 to observe.
Definition 3 corresponds to the special case where θ perceives all other agents to share her
perceptions (i.e., P̂θ,θ0 = P̂θ and ŝθ,θ0 = ŝθ ).
While this generalization allows θ to perceive others to disagree with her perceptions P̂θ and
ŝθ , we note that P̂θ and ŝθ themselves are unchanged relative to Definition 3: Indeed, we have
ŝ

Gŝθ,θ0 ,P̂θ,θ0 = Lθθ,θ
0

0 ,P̂θ,θ 0

AN ,P

= Lŝθθ0 ,P̂θ = Lŝθθ ,P̂θ = Lsθ

.

The first equality holds because P̂θ,θ0 is non-assortative, the second by perceived observational
consistency, the third because P̂θ is non-assortative, and the fourth by observational consistency.
Thus, just as under Definition 3, the perceived best-response condition reduces to (10), i.e.,
AN ,P

ŝθ (θ0 ) ∈ BRθ0 (Lsθ

AN ,P

, Lsθ

).

Based on this and observational consistency, the derivation of θ’s perceived type distribution F̂θ
and strategy profile ŝθ is unchanged, so all results in Section 4 remain valid. At the same time,
θ’s perceptions about θ0 ’s perceptions F̂θ,θ0 and ŝθ,θ0 are flexible; for example, the definition is
consistent with θ being aware that coherent assortativity neglect perceptions vary across types.
The above definition can be viewed as a misspecified version of a belief system in Esponda’s
(2013) level-1 rationalizable conjectural equilibrium (i.e., with first-order belief in rationality
and observational consistency): We assume that agents dogmatically believe that society is nonassortative and that others share this perception (and for simplicity we do not model agents’
kth-order beliefs beyond k = 2). Note that modeling agents’ entire hierarchy of perceptions
and imposing rationality and observational consistency up to higher orders would put more
discipline on θ’s perceptions about others’ perceptions; however, as any such belief system is a
special case of the above definition, θ’s first-order perceptions P̂θ and ŝθ remain unchanged.

C.2
C.2.1

Weaker forms of assortativity neglect
Hybrid model

Under ANE, all agents suffer from assortativity neglect. More realistically, some agents might
be less prone to misperception than others, for example, due to having access to information
about global (rather than just local) action distributions. To capture this, consider a simple
hybrid model: For each type θ, only fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of agents suffer from assortativity
neglect; the remaining share of agents best-respond to the correct local and global action
distributions. An α-assortativity neglect equilibrium (α-ANE) consists of strategy profiles
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sa for assortativity neglect agents and sc for correct agents such that, for all θ,
sa (θ) ∈ BRθ



αLθsa ,P

α)Lsθc ,P , αLsθa ,P

α)Lsθc ,P



,
+ (1 −
+ (1 −


sc (θ) ∈ BRθ αGsa ,P + (1 − α)Gsc ,P , αLsθa ,P + (1 − α)Lsθc ,P .

(17)

To analyze α-ANE, we again consider linear best-response games with strategic complementarities. Just as in Section 3.2, we can iterate the best-response conditions (17) under the
Markov process P . This yields the following α-ANE strategy profiles sαa and sαc for assortativity
neglect and correct agents:
sαa (θ)

= θ + (β + γ)

∞
X

(γ + αβ)t−1 EP [θt | θ0 = θ] +

t=1

sαc (θ)

(β + γ)(1 − α)βEF [θ0 ]
(1 − γ − αβ)(1 − β − γ)

∞
X
(1 − α(β + γ)) βEF [θ0 ]
t−1
(γ + αβ) EP [θt | θ0 = θ] +
=θ+γ
.
(1 − γ − αβ)(1 − β − γ)
t=1

(18)

(19)

Thus, the higher-order expectation terms take a “quasi-hyperbolic” form, with geometric discount factor γ + αβ increasing in the share α of assortativity neglect agents. Note that when
α = 0 (resp. α = 1), sαc (resp. sαa ) reduces to the expression for Nash (resp. ANE) in Section 3.2.
Let Gαa and Gαc denote the global action distributions among assortativity neglect and correct
agents. The following result compares action dispersion across both groups of agents, as well
as across different values of α:
Proposition C.1. Fix any (P, β, γ). For any α ∈ [0, 1], there is a unique α-ANE, whose
strategy profiles are given by (18) and (19). Moreover, (i) Gαa is more dispersive than Gαc , and
(ii) both Gαa and Gαc are more dispersive the greater α.
Thus, behavior among assortativity neglect agents is more dispersed than among correct
agents, but action dispersion among both groups is exacerbated the greater the share α of
assortativity neglect agents. This captures a sense in which assortativity neglect agents can
exert a negative externality on society, as they drive up miscoordination among all agents.
Given (18)–(19), similar arguments as for the main analysis imply that both Gαa and Gαc
are subject to analogous comparative statics and multiplier effects as GAN in Propositions 24. Moreover, coherent perceptions P̂θ = F̂θ × F̂θ and ŝθ for assortativity neglect agents can
be defined analogously to Definition 3.34 As in Proposition 5, each θ admits unique coherent
assortativity neglect perceptions, and the comparative statics in Propositions 6-7 extend.35
sα ,P

sα ,P

Specifically, let Lα,P
= αLθa + (1 − α)Lθc denote θ’s true local action distribution in the α-ANE. A coθ
herent perception for an assortativity neglect agent θ consists of a perceived non-assortative society P̂θ = F̂θ × F̂θ
and perceived strategy profile ŝθ such that (i) Lα,P
= Lθŝθ ,P̂θ ; and (ii) for each θ0 , ŝθ (θ0 ) ∈ BRθ0 (Gŝθ ,P̂θ , Lŝθθ0 ,P̂θ ).
θ
35
More precisely, the comparative statics are now with respect to increasing β and γ separately (as β + γ is
no longer a sufficient statistic). The analog of Proposition 6 is that F̂θ is increasing in (β, γ) with respect to the
34

37

C.2.2

Partial assortativity neglect

Alternatively, one can relax the assumption that agents fully neglect assortativity, i.e., perceive
the global action distribution to exactly coincide with their local action distributions. Consider
the following reduced-form extension of Definition 2 that can capture various forms of partial
assortativity neglect: A strategy profile s is a partial assortativity neglect equilibrium
(PANE) if for each θ, there exists a perceived global action distribution Ĝθ ∈ ∆(A) such that
(i) s(θ) ∈ BRθ (Ĝθ , Ls,P
θ ) for each θ and (ii) Ĝθ is FOSD-increasing in θ. That is, each agent
θ best-responds to a correct perception of her local action distribution, but misperceives the
global action distribution to be Ĝθ , where (ii) represents the false consensus effect that higher
types perceive higher global action distributions. One simple parametrization of PANE is when
agents’ perceived global action distributions are a convex combination of the true local and
global action distributions; that is, s is monotonic such that for some ε ∈ [0, 1],
Ĝθ = εLs,P
+ (1 − ε)Gs,P , for all θ.
θ

(20)

This captures a form of “partial projection” of local action distributions onto the global action
distribution that nests both ANE (ε = 1) and Nash (ε = 0).
Extending Proposition 1, the following result shows that, in linear best-response games with
strategic complementarities, any PANE induces more action dispersion than Nash (subject to
a regularity condition that always holds under ANE):
Proposition C.2. Fix any (P, β, γ). For any PANE s in which perceived global action averages
´
a dĜθ (a) are absolutely continuous in θ, the global action distribution Gs,P is more dispersive
than the Nash action distribution.
Moreover, for the parametrization in (20), it is straightforward to generalize the Markov
process representation of equilibrium strategies;36 based on this, all results in Section 3 extend,
with action dispersion intermediate between Nash and ANE.
One can also extend the definition of coherent perceptions to PANE. Given any society P
and PANE s with perceived global action distributions (Ĝθ )θ , define a coherent perception
for type θ to consist of a perceived society P̂θ and a perceived strategy profile ŝθ such that:
1. (a) Ls,P
= Lŝθθ ,P̂θ ;
θ
(b) Ĝθ = Gŝθ ,P̂θ .
2. For each θ0 , ŝθ (θ0 ) ∈ BRθ0 (Gŝθ ,P̂θ , Lŝθθ0 ,P̂θ ).
dilation order (defined in Appendix C.3). The false consensus effect and comparative statics of distributions of
perceived means with respect to (β, γ) are the same as in Proposition 7.
P∞
(1−ε)βEF [θ 0 ]
36
For any (P, γ, β), the unique PANE satisfying (20) is sε (θ) = t=0 (γ +εβ)t EP [θt |θ0 = θ]+ (1−γ−εβ)(1−β−γ)
.
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Conditions 1(a) and 2 are the same as in Definition 3. Condition 1(b) requires that the perceived
global action distribution Ĝθ to which θ best-responds in the PANE s matches the global action
distribution under her perceived society P̂θ and strategy profile ŝθ . In the case of coherent ANE
perceptions, the latter condition is immediate from the assumption that P̂θ is non-assortative.37
Obtaining general analogs of Propositions 5–7 for coherent PANE perceptions is beyond the
scope of this paper. However, the following example considers the case of Gaussian societies:
Example C.1. Fix a Gaussian society P = (µ, σ 2 , ρ) and consider linear best-response games
with strategic complementarities. For each ρ̂ ∈ [0, ρ], we can construct a PANE s∗ and associated coherent perceptions (P̂θ , ŝθ )θ such that each type θ’s perceived society P̂θ is Gaussian
with correlation coefficient ρ̂; that is, θ underestimates the degree of assortativity ρ to be ρ̂,
but does not necessarily fully neglect it. Specifically, for each θ:
1. θ’s action is s∗ (θ) =

θ−µ
ρ̂
1−γρ−β ρ−
1−ρ̂

+

µ
;
1−β−γ

2. θ’s coherent perceived society is Gaussian with P̂θ = (µ̂θ , σ̂ 2 , ρ̂), where
µ̂θ = µ + (θ − µ)

(1 − β − γ)(ρ − ρ̂)(γ +
(β + γ(1 − ρ̂))(1 − γρ −

β
)
1−ρ̂
,
ρ−ρ̂
β 1−ρ̂ )

(1 − ρ2 )
σ̂ 2 = σ 2
(1 − ρ̂2 )

3. θ’s coherent perceived strategy profile satisfies ŝθ (θ0 ) =

θ−µ
1−γ ρ̂

+

µ̂θ
1−β−γ

1 − γ ρ̂
1 − γρ − β ρ−ρ̂
1−ρ̂

!2

for all θ0 .

See Online Appendix D.2.3 for the derivation; in particular, the fact that agents underestimate
assortativity (i.e., ρ̂ ∈ [0, ρ]) is key in ensuring that perceived global action distributions Ĝθ =
Gŝθ ,P̂θ are FOSD-increasing in θ, as required by PANE. Observe that the above expressions
generalize the ones under Nash (ρ̂ = ρ) and ANE (ρ̂ = 0) in Examples 1–2. Moreover, the
qualitative predictions for action dispersion and perceived type variances and means are the
same as under full assortativity neglect.
Finally, we note that one can show conversely that any linear PANE that admits Gaussian
coherent perceptions must take the form in conditions 1–3 for some ρ̂ ∈ [0, ρ].
N

C.3

Strategic substitutes

Consider linear best-response games with global and/or local strategic substitutes (i.e., β ≤ 0
and/or γ ≤ 0). The following result shows that Nash and ANE strategies admit the same
Markov process representations as in the complementarity case. Moreover, we provide a simple
condition (satisfied, e.g., by Gaussian societies) under which these strategies are monotone:
The fact that P̂θ is non-assortative implies that Gŝθ ,P̂θ = Lŝθθ ,P̂θ , which is equal to Ls,P
by 1(a). Since under
θ
ANE Ĝθ = Ls,P
,
this
implies
1(b).
θ
37
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;

Proposition C.3. Fix any P and β, γ with |β + γ|, |γ| < 1. The unique Nash and ANE
strategies sN E and sAN are given by (6) and (8). Moreover, sN E and sAN are strictly increasing
if EP [θ1 | θ0 = θ] − EP [θ1 | θ0 = θ0 ] ≤ |θ − θ0 | for all θ, θ0 .
Analyzing equilibrium behavior is more difficult than under complementarities, because
when γ < 0 (resp. β + γ < 0) the discounted terms in (6) (resp. (8)) alternate signs across odd
and even t. To extend our comparative statics results, we impose the condition on societies
from Proposition C.3 to ensure monotonicity of Nash and ANE. We also employ a weakening
of the more-dispersive order: G1 is a dilation of G2 (Shaked and Shanthikumar, 2007) if
´
´
there exists b ∈ R such that φ(a)d G1 (a) ≥ φ(a + b)d G2 (a) for any convex function φ
under which the integrals are well-defined; that is, G1 is a mean-preserving spread of G2 up to
normalizing means. Finally, we use the following strenghtening of the more-assortative order
from Section 3.3: C1 is strongly more assortative than C2 , denoted C1 %SM A C2 , if
C1 (z|y) − C1 (z|x) ≥ C2 (z|y) − C2 (z|x),

for all x, y, z ∈ (0, 1) with x ≥ y.

To interpret, recall that assortativity of C requires the distribution of matches’ quantiles to be
first-order stochastically increasing in own quantile; C1 is strongly more assortative than C2 if
this effect is globally stronger under C1 than under C2 .
Proposition C.4. Fix (Fi , Ci , βi , γi ) with |γi + βi |, |γi | < 1 and EPi [θ1 | θ0 = θ] − EPi [θ1 | θ0 =
E
θ0 ] ≤ |θ − θ0 | for all θ, θ0 , i = 1, 2. Let GAN
and GN
denote the corresponding ANE and Nash
i
i
global action distributions.
1. Suppose F1 = F2 , β1 = β2 , γ1 = γ2 , and C1 is strongly more assortative than C2 . Then:
(a) GAN
is a dilation of GAN
if βi + γi < 0, and vice versa if βi + γi > 0.
2
1
E
E
(b) GN
is a dilation of GN
if γi < 0, and vice versa if γi > 0.
2
1

2. Suppose C1 = C2 , β1 = β2 , γ1 = γ2 , and F1 is more dispersive than F2 . Then GAN
is a
1
NE
E
dilation of GAN
is a dilation of GN
2 , and G1
2 .
3. Suppose F1 = F2 , C1 = C2 . If β1 + γ1 ≥ β2 + γ2 (resp. γ1 ≥ γ2 ), then GAN
is a dilation
1
E
E
of GAN
(resp. GN
is a dilation of GN
2
1
2 ).
Relative to the complementarities case, the comparative statics with respect to assortativity
have flipped directions under substitutes. The first part also implies that, under local complementarities but stronger global substitutes (i.e., γ > 0, β + γ < 0), increases in assortativity
have the opposite effect on Nash and ANE action dispersion; this contrasts with the multiplier
effect in Proposition 2, where the difference between Nash and ANE was one of magnitude.
Finally, the third part implies that if β ≤ 0, then the Nash action distribution is a dilation of
the ANE distribution (assuming monotonicity), reversing the comparison in Proposition 1.
40

Each agent continues to admit unique coherent assortativity neglect perceptions (see Proposition C.5 below). Proposition 6 (on comparative statics of perceived type dispersion) also
remains valid up to replacing the dispersiveness with the dilation order.

C.4

Non-linear best-response functions

Beyond linear best-response games, ANE and the associated coherent perceptions can also be
analyzed in any other population game of the form in Section 2. Below, we show that several
of our main insights hold more generally.
First, by the same attribution error logic underlying Proposition 5, the following result
shows that the existence and uniqueness of coherent assortativity neglect perceptions remains
valid in general population games (under mild conditions on best-responses). For simplicity,
we drop the regularity assumptions on strategy profiles and type distributions (L1 , absolute
continuity, connected support):
Proposition C.5. Consider any population game as defined in Section 2. Assume that BRθ (G, L)
is single-valued, and increasing and surjective in θ for all G, L ∈ ∆(A). Fix any P and ANE
sAN .38 For each type θ, the corresponding coherent assortativity neglect perceptions P̂θ = F̂θ × F̂θ
and ŝθ exist and are unique.
Second, we can extend the comparison of action dispersion across ANE and Nash (Proposition 1) to additively separable best-responses with purely global complementarities. This case
allows one to sidestep difficulties associated with equilibrium multiplicity, as all Nash action
distributions are equally dispersive:
Proposition C.6. Assume that BRθ (G, L) = φ(θ)+ψ(G) for some increasing function φ : Θ →
A and FOSD-increasing function ψ : ∆(A) → A. Fix any P . The global action distribution
under any monotone ANE sAN is more dispersive than under any Nash equilibrium sN E .
At the same time, a full generalization of the results in the main text is beyond the scope
of this paper. One challenge is that our representation of Nash and ANE in terms of iterated
expectations of the Markov process P relied on the linearity of best-responses. This representation played a central role for our comparative statics analysis in Sections 3.3 and 4.3; in
contrast, to the best of our knowledge, existing comparative statics results for general games
with strategic complementarities do not apply to our setting.39
38

ANE exist under standard conditions that ensure a solution to the fixed-point problem s(θ) =
BRθ (Gs,P , Ls,P
θ ).
39
A large literature conducts comparisons of equilibrium action distributions in terms of first-order stochastic
dominance (for a survey, see Vives, 2005), but comparative statics results in terms of dispersion (e.g., meanpreserving spread, second-order stochastic dominance) are more limited: Jensen (2018) analyzes the effect of
type dispersion on action dispersion; his approach relies on players’ types being independently distributed (while
our setting displays correlation). Mekonnen and Leal Vizcaíno (2021) consider a different setting, where players
observe signals about an uncertain fundamental, and analyze the effect of signal precision on action dispersion.
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D

Omitted Proofs

D.1

Proofs for Appendix A

D.1.1

Proof of Lemma A.1

For the first point, note that for any f ∈ L1 ,
ˆ1
kTC f k =

ˆ1 ˆ1
c(x0 , x)|f (x0 )|dx0 dx =

|TC f (x)|dx ≤
0

ˆ1

0

0

|f (x0 )|dx0 = kf k < ∞.
0

Thus, TC : L1 → L1 . Moreover, since TC is clearly linear, the above ensures that it is also
continuous.
For the second point, consider f ∈ I. Since C is assortative, TC f (x) ≥ TC f (x0 ) for all
x ≥ x0 , so that TC f is weakly increasing. To show that TC f is absolutely continuous, note that
for each x, x0 ∈ (0, 1),

ˆ 1
ˆ 1 ˆ x
0
TC f (x) =
c(y, x)f (y)dy =
c2 (y, z)dz + c(y, x ) f (y)dy
0
0
x0
ˆ xˆ 1
c2 (y, z)f (y)dydz + TC f (x0 ),
=
x0

0

where c2 denotes the partial derivative of c with respect to the second argument, which exists almost everywhere by the
´ 1absolute continuity assumption on c. Thus TC f is absolutely
0
continuous with (TC f ) (z) = 0 c2 (y, z)f (y)dy for each z.
Finally, for the third point, fix any f ∈ L1 and γ ∈ (−1, 1). Then for any τ > τ 0 ,
k

τ
X
t=0

0

t

t

γ (TC ) f −

τ
X
t=0

τ
X

τ
X

0

|γ|τ +1
kf k,
γ (TC ) f k ≤
|γ| k(TC ) f k ≤
|γ| kf k ≤
1−γ
t=τ 0 +1
t=τ 0 +1
t

t

t

t

t

which vanishes as τ 0 → ∞. Thus, the sequence is Cauchy. Since the space L1 is complete, this
yields the desired result.
D.1.2

Proof of Lemma A.3

%m -order: It is clear from the definition that %m is reflexive and transitive; moreover, by
Lemma A.2, %m is linear. To check that %m is continuous, take sequences fn → f, gn → g in

1

I such that fn %m gn for each n. For any y ∈ (0, 1), we have
ˆ 1
ˆ 1
ˆ 1
|
f (x)dx −
fn (x)dx| ≤
|f (x) − fn (x)|dx ≤ kf − fn k → 0
y

y

y

´1
´1
´1
´1
´1
and likewise | y g(x)dx − y gn (x)dx| → 0. Since y fn (x)dx ≥ y gn (x)dx and 0 fn (x)dx =
´1
´1
´1
´1
´1
g (x)dx for each n, this implies y f (x)dx ≥ y g(x)dx and 0 f (x)dx = 0 g(x)dx. Thus,
0 n
f %m g by Lemma A.2.
To´ verify that ´%m is isotone, take any f, g ∈ I such that´f %m g and set h := f − g. Note
1
1
1
that 0 h(x)dx = 0 TC h(x)dx = 0. It suffices to show that y TC h(x)dx ≥ 0 for all y ∈ (0, 1).
´1
To see this, note that y TC h(x)dx is given by
ˆ

1

ˆ

ˆ

1

1

ˆ

0

0

ˆ

0

y
1

1

(1 − C(y|z))h(z)dz

c(z|x)dxh(z)dz =

h(z)c(z|x)dzdx =
y

ˆ

1


1
ˆ z
ˆ
∂1 − C(y|z) z
0
0
0
0
= −
h(z )dz
h(z )dz dz + (1 − C(y|z))
∂z
0
0
0
0
ˆ 1
ˆ
∂C(y|z) z
h(z 0 )dz 0 dz ≥ 0,
=
∂z
0
0
´1
´1
where the second equality uses y c(z|x)dx = y c(x|z)dx = 1 − C(y|z), the third holds by
´1
integration by parts ´(using absolute continuity of c), the fourth uses 0 h(z)dz = 0, and the
z
final inequality uses 0 h(z 0 )dz 0 ≤ 0 (by f %m g) and assortativity of C.
%d -order: It is clear from the definition that %d is reflexive, transitive, and linear. To check
that it is continuous, take sequences fn → f and gn → g in I such that fn %d gn for each n. By
standard results (e.g., Theorem 13.6 in Aliprantis and Border (2006)), we can find subsequences
(fnk )k∈N , (gnk )k∈N such that fnk (x) → f (x) and gnk (x) → g(x) for almost all x ∈ (0, 1). This
implies f (x) − f (x0 ) ≥ g(x) − g(x0 ) for almost all x ≥ x0 , which ensures f %d g since f and g
are continuous.
To show that %d is isotone, first consider any bounded f, g ∈ I such that f %d g. Since f
and g are absolutely
functions f 0 , g 0 : (0, 1) → R such that
´ x 0 continuous, there exist ´integrable
x 0
f (x) = f (0) + 0 f (y) dy and g(x) = g(0) + 0 g (y) dy for all x ∈ (0, 1). Then, for any x ≥ x0
and C ∈ C, integration by parts yields
ˆ 1
0
TC f (x) − TC f (x ) =
f (y)(c(y|x) − c(y|x0 ))dy
0
ˆ 1
= −
f 0 (y)(C(y|x) − C(y|x0 ))dy + [f (y)(C(y|x) − C(y|x0 ))]10
ˆ0 1
ˆ 1
0
0
= −
f (y)(C(y|x) − C(y|x ))dy ≥ −
g 0 (y)(C(y|x) − C(y|x0 ))dy
0
ˆ0 1
= −
g 0 (y)(C(y|x) − C(y|x0 ))dy + [g(y)(C(y|x) − C(y|x0 ))]10
ˆ 10
=
g(y)(c(y|x) − c(y|x0 ))dy = TC g(x) − TC g(x0 ).
0

2

Here, the inequality holds because the fact that f %d g and f, g ∈ I implies f 0 (y) ≥ g 0 (y) ≥ 0
for almost all y ∈ (0, 1).
Next, consider arbitrary f, g ∈ I such that f %d g. By defining bounded functions


1
1
1
1


f
(
)
if
x
∈
(0,
)
 n
g( n ) if x ∈ (0, n )
n
fn (x) = f (x) if x ∈ [ n1 , n−1
gn (x) = g(x) if x ∈ [ n1 , n−1
(21)
]
]
n
n


 n−1
 n−1
n−1
n−1
f ( n ) if x ∈ ( n , 1)
g( n ) if x ∈ ( n , 1)
for each n ∈ N, we obtain fn %d gn for each n and fn → f, gn → g. For any C ∈ C, since
TC is a continuous operator, this implies TC fn → TC f and TC gn → TC g. Thus, TC f %d TC g
by continuity of %d , as we already know that TC fn %d TC gn from the previous part of the
proof.
D.1.3

Proof of Lemma A.4

The base case t = 0 holds because of the following result by Ryff (1963): Call a linear operator
T : L1 → L1 an S-operator if f %m T f for all F ∈ I. The representation theorem in Ryff
(1963) implies that T is´ an S-operator if there exists some measurable function K : [0, 1]2 → R
1
d
K(x, y)f (y)dy for all f ∈ L1 and almost every x and the following
such that T f (x) = dx
0
conditions are met: (1) K(0, y) = 0 for all 0 ≤ y ≤ 1; (2) essupy V (K(·, y)) < ∞, where V (·)
´1
denotes the total variation and essup the essential supremum; (3) 0 K(x, y)f (y)dy is absolutely
´1
continuous in x for all f ∈ L1 ; (4) x = 0 K(x, y)dy; (5) x1 < x2 =⇒ K(x1 , ·) ≤ K(x2 , ·); and
(6) K(1, y) = 1 for all y ∈ [0, 1].
Since C ∈ C, it is easy to see that TC satisfies these conditions with K(x, y) := C(x | y) for
all x, y, so that TC is an S-operator. Thus, f %m TC f , proving the base case. The inductive
step then follows from isotonicity of %m (Lemma A.3).

D.2

Proofs for Appendix C

D.2.1

Proof of Proposition C.1

Let µ := EF [θ]. Consider strategy profiles gaα and gcα of assortativity neglect and correct agents
expressed as functions of quantiles. Write g α := αgaα + (1 − α)gcα . In an α-ANE, we must have
ˆ 1
α
−1
α
α
−1
α
ga (x) = F (x) + (β + γ)TC g (x),
gc (x) = F (x) + γTC g (x) + β
g α (y)dy
0

for each x ∈ (0, 1). Since g α = αgaα + (1 − α)gcα , it follows that
ˆ
α

g (x) = F

−1

α

g α (y)dy

(x) + (γ + αβ)TC g (x) + (1 − α)β
0

3

1

´1
for each x, which implies 0 g α (y)dy =
iterating the above equation we obtain
g α (x) =

X

µ
1−β−γ

by integrating both sides over x. Moreover,

(γ + αβ)t (TC )t F −1 (x) +

t≥0

(1 − α)βµ
,
(1 − γ − αβ)(1 − β − γ)

where the convergence of the RHS can be shown as in the proof of Lemma 1. Note that this
uniquely determines g α for any α. By the best-response conditions, we obtain
gaα (x) = F −1 (x) + (β + γ)TC g α (x)
X
= F −1 (x) + (β + γ)
(γ + αβ)t−1 (TC )t F −1 (x) +
t≥1

gcα (x)

= F

−1

ˆ

α

(β + γ)(1 − α)βµ
,
(1 − γ − αβ)(1 − β − γ)

1

g α (y)dy

(x) + γTC g (x) + β
0

= F −1 (x) + γ

X

(γ + αβ)t−1 (TC )t F −1 (x) +

t≥1

(1 − α(β + γ)) βµ
(1 − γ − αβ)(1 − β − γ)

for each x, yielding (18)-(19). Then the claim gaα %d gcα and the comparative statics with respect
to α can be verified using linearity and continuity of %d .
D.2.2

Proof of Proposition C.2

D.2.3

Details for Example C.1

´
Write P = (F, C). Consider any PANE s with a dĜθ (a) absolutely continuous in θ. Then
´
s(θ) = θ+β a dĜθ (a)+γEP [s(θ0 )|θ] for each θ. Thus, s is the Nash equilibrium in environment
´
(F̃ , C, β̃, γ), where β̃ = 0 and F̃ −1 (x) = F −1 (x) + β a dĜF −1 (x) (a) for each x (note that
´
F̃ ∈ F, as adĜθ (a) is increasing and absolutely continuous in θ). Since F̃ is more dispersive
than F (and the global complementarity parameter does not affect Nash action dispersion by
Proposition 4), Proposition 3 implies that Gs,P is more dispersive than the Nash global action
distribution in environment (P, β, γ).

Fix any ρ̂ ∈ [0, ρ]. We verify that, for the expressions in Example C.1, s∗ is a PANE and
1
1
∗
(P̂θ , ŝθ ) are associated coherent perceptions. Let x := 1−γρ−β
ρ−ρ̂ and x̂ := 1−γ ρ̂ , so that s (θ) =
1−ρ̂

µ
µ̂θ
x(θ − µ) + 1−β−γ
and ŝθ (θ0 ) = x̂(θ0 − µ̂θ ) + 1−β−γ
for all θ, θ0 . Since P (·|θ) is distributed
∗
N (ρθ + (1 − ρ)µ, (1 − ρ2 )σ 2 ), θ’s true local action distribution Lsθ ,P is distributed N (xρ(θ −
µ
µ)+ 1−β−γ
, x2 (1−ρ2 )σ 2 ). Since P̂θ (·|θ) is distributed N (ρ̂θ +(1− ρ̂)µ̂θ , (1− ρ̂2 )σ̂ 2 ), θ’s perceived
µ̂θ
local action distribution Lŝθθ ,P̂θ is distributed N (x̂ρ̂(θ−µ̂θ )+ 1−β−γ
, x̂2 (1−ρ̂2 )σ̂ 2 ). Thus, condition
1(a) of coherency can be verified by observing that, by construction, the mean and variance of
∗
Lθs ,P and Lŝθθ ,P̂θ are equal.
To verify condition 2, note that, by construction, θ’s perceived strategy profile ŝθ is the
Nash equilibrium in society P̂θ = (µ̂θ , σ̂ 2 , ρ̂) (see Example 1).
Finally, we verify that s∗ is a PANE with perceived global action distributions Ĝθ = Ĝŝθ ,P̂θ ,
as required by condition 1(b). Note first that, by construction, s∗ (θ) = ŝθ (θ) for all θ. Thus,
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∗

conditions 1(a) and 2 imply that s∗ (θ) ∈ BRθ (Ĝŝθ ,P̂θ , Lsθ ,P ). It remains to check that Ĝŝθ ,P̂θ
µ̂θ
is FOSD-increasing in θ. This holds because Ĝŝθ ,P̂θ is distributed N ( 1−β−γ
, x̂2 σ̂ 2 ) and because
ρ̂ ≤ ρ ensures that µ̂θ is increasing in θ.
D.2.4

Proof of Proposition C.3

We only consider Nash equilibrium, as ANE at (P, β, γ) corresponds to Nash equilibrium at
(P, 0, β + γ). Let µ := EF [θ] and, for each x ∈ (0, 1), define
h(x) :=

X

γ t (TC )t F −1 (x) +

t≥0

βµ
,
(1 − γ)(1 − β − γ)

which is a well-defined function in L1 as |γ| < 1. Following the same argument as in the proof
of Lemma 1, the strategy profile defined by sN E (θ) = h(F −1 (θ)) for each θ is the unique Nash
equilibrium and satisfies (6).
To show the “moreover” part, note that
h=

X

γ 2t TC2t (F −1 + γTC F −1 ) +

t≥0

βµ
.
(1 − γ)(1 − β − γ)

Since γ > −1, the additional assumption on P implies that F −1 + γTC F −1 is strictly increasing.
Therefore, h, and hence sN E , is strictly increasing.
D.2.5

Proof of Proposition C.4

We first show that, analogously to the relationship between %M A and %m (Lemma B.1), the
strongly more-assortative order %SM A is the “dual order” of the dispersiveness order %d :
Lemma D.1. Fix any C1 , C2 ∈ C. Then C1 %SM A C2 if and only if TC1 f %d TC2 f for all
f ∈ I.
Proof. For the “only if” part, suppose that C1 %SM A C2 . First consider any bounded f ∈ I.
0
Then there exists an integrable
almost everywhere
´ x 0 function f : (0, 1) → R that is nonnegative
such that f (x) = f (0) + 0 f (y)dy for all x ∈ (0, 1). Thus, for any x ≥ x0 , integration by parts
yields
ˆ 1
0
TC1 f (x) − TC1 f (x ) =
f (y)(c1 (y|x) − c1 (y|x0 ))dy
0
ˆ 1
= −
f 0 (y)(C1 (y|x) − C1 (y|x0 ))dy + [f (y)(C1 (y|x) − C1 (y|x0 ))]10
ˆ0 1
ˆ 1
0
0
= −
f (y)(C1 (y|x) − C1 (y|x ))dy ≥ −
f 0 (y)(C2 (y|x) − C2 (y|x0 ))dy
0
ˆ0 1
= −
f 0 (y)(C2 (y|x) − C2 (y|x0 ))dy + [f (y)(C2 (y|x) − C2 (y|x0 ))]10
ˆ 10
=
f (y)(c2 (y|x) − c2 (y|x0 ))dy = TC2 f (x) − TC2 f (x0 ),
0
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where the inequality holds because f 0 (y) ≥ 0 for almost all y. Hence, TC1 f %d TC2 f .
Next take an arbitrary f ∈ I. Define the sequence of bounded functions (fn ) as in (21),
so that fn → f . By the previous observation, we have TC1 fn %d TC2 fn for each n. Since
TC1 fn → TC1 f and TC2 fn → TC2 f by continuity of TC1 and TC2 , continuity of %d then yields
TC1 f %d TC2 f .
For the “if” part, we prove the contrapositive. Suppose that C1 is not strongly more assortative than C2 . That is, there exist y and x > x0 such that
C2 (y|x) − C2 (y|x0 ) < C1 (y|x) − C1 (y|x0 ) ≤ 0.
Since C1 and C2 admit densities,
´ z the above inequality holds throughout some interval (y1 , y2 ) 3
y. Define f ∈ I by f (z) = 0 f 0 (y 0 )dy 0 for all z, where f 0 is an integrable function given by
f 0 (y 0 ) = 1 for y 0 ∈ (y1 , y2 ) and f 0 (y 0 ) = 0 for all y 0 6∈ (y1 , y2 ). Using the same integration by
parts argument as above, we obtain
ˆ
0
TC1 f (x) − TC1 f (x ) = − f 0 (y)(C1 (y|x) − C1 (y|x0 ))dy
ˆ
< − f 0 (y)(C2 (y|x) − C2 (y|x0 ))dy = TC2 f (x) − TC2 f (x0 ).
Thus, TC1 f %d TC2 f fails.
Proof of Proposition C.4. Note that Nash and ANE strategies are monotone by the assumption on Pi (Proposition C.3). We prove each part only for Nash, as the ANE at (P, β, γ)
is the Nash at (P, 0, β + γ). For each f, g ∈ I, write f %dil g iff f %m g + α for some constant
function α. This order inherits linearity, isotonicity, and continuity from %m . Note that for
F, G ∈ F, F is a dilation of G iff F −1 %dil G−1 ; moreover, the %dil order is implied by the %d
order.
Second part: Let β := β1 = β2 , γ := γ1 = γ2 , C := C1 = C2 . The proof of Proposition 3
carries over to the case γ ≥ 0, so we focus on the case γ < 0. Since β only shifts the action
mean without affecting the dilation order, we also assume β = 0 without loss.
For each i = 1, 2, define an operator Γi : I → I by Γi f = Fi−1 + γTC Fi−1 + γ 2 TC2 f for each
f ∈ I. Note that Γi (·) is increasing, as (1 + γTC )Fi−1 is increasing by the assumption on Pi .
We make two preliminary observations:
1. For i = 1, 2, Γi f %dil Γi g whenever f %dil g.
This follows from isotonicity of %dil .
2. Γ1 f %dil Γ2 f for each f ∈ I.
To see this, note that F1−1 %d F2−1 implies F1−1 − F2−1 ∈ I. Thus,
F1−1 − F2−1 %m TC (F1−1 − F2−1 ) %dil −γTC (F1−1 − F2−1 ),
where the first comparison uses Lemma A.4 and the second uses −1 < γ ≤ 0. Therefore,
F1−1 + γTC F1−1 %dil F2−1 + γTC F2−1 , and thus Γ1 f %dil Γ2 f for each f ∈ I.
Now, fix any f ∈ I. Let
gi :=

X

γ t TCt Fi = lim Γti (f ).
t→∞

t≥0

6

NE
E
is increasing. By induction, we show that Γt1 f %dil Γt2 f for
This is the inverse cdf of GN
i , as si
t−1
all t. The base case t = 1 holds by the second observation above. Moreover, if Γt−1
1 f %dil Γ2 f ,
then
t
Γt1 f %dil Γ2 Γt−1
1 f %dil Γ2 f

holds by observations 1-2. Given this, g1 %dil g2 follows by continuity of %dil .
First part: Let F := F1 = F2 , β := β1 = β2 , γ := γ1 = γ2 . The proof of Proposition 2 carries
over to the case γ ≤ 0, so we focus on the case γ < 0. Since β only shifts the action
mean without
P
affecting the dilation order, we also assume β = 0 without loss. Let gi := t≥0 γ t TCt i F −1 ; this
E
E
is monotone.
since sN
is the inverse cdf of GN
i
i
1
For each i = 1, 2 and any f ∈ L , the linearity of the operators TCt i implies
(1 − γi TCi )

X

γit TCt i f =

X

(γit TCt i )(1 − γi TCi )f = f,

(22)

t≥0

t≥0

where 1 denotes the identity operator. Observe that
X
X
g2 =
γ t TCt 2 F −1 =
γ t TCt 2 (1 − γTC1 )g1 ,
t≥0

t≥0

where the second equality uses (22) with i = 1 and f = F −1 . Likewise,
X
g1 =
γ t TCt 2 (1 − γTC2 )g1 ,
t≥0

by the second equality in (22) with i = 2 and f = g1 . This shows that g1 and g2 correspond to the
inverse cdfs of the Nash action distributions in two modified environments that share a common
interaction structure C2 and complementarity parameters (0, γ) and have type distributions F̃1
and F̃2 with inverse cdfs F̃1−1 := (1 − γTC2 )g1 and F̃2−1 := (1 − γTC1 )g1 , respectively. Since
g1 ∈ I, γ < 0, and C1 %SM A C2 , Lemma D.1 implies F̃2−1 %d F̃1−1 .
Given this, the arguments in part 2 above imply that g2 %dil g1 , provided we can show
that (1 + γTC2 )F̃i−1 is increasing for i = 1, 2 (which ensures that the corresponding operators
Γi (·) in the two modified societies are increasing). For i = 2, note that (1 + γTC2 )F̃2−1 :=
(1 + γTC2 )(1 − γTC1 )g1 = (1 + γTC2 )F −1 by (22), which is increasing by the assumption on
P2 and since γ > −1. For i = 1, note that (i) (1 − γ 2 TC21 )g1 = (1 + γTC1 )F −1 is increasing
(by the assumption on P1 and since γ > −1), and (ii) γ 2 TC21 g1 %d γ 2 TC22 g1 since C1 %SM A C2
(Lemma D.1). Combining (i) and (ii) yields that (1 + γTC2 )F̃1−1 := (1 − γ 2 TC22 )g1 is increasing,
as required.
Third part: Let F := F1 = F2 , C := C1 = C2 . The proof of Proposition 4 carries over to the
case γi ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2. Thus, by the transitivity of the dilation order, we can focus on the case
γi ≤ 0 for i = 1, 2. Since β only shifts the action P
mean without affecting the dilation order, we
E
also assume β1 = β2 = 0 without loss. Let gi := t≥0 γit TCt F −1 ; this is the inverse cdf of GN
i
E
since sN
is monotone. Observe that
i
X
X
γ1t TCt (1 − γ2 TC )g2 ,
g1 =
γ1t TCt F −1 =
t≥0

t≥0
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where the second equality uses (22) with i = 1 and f = F −1 . Likewise,
X
g2 =
γ1t TCt (1 − γ1 TC )g2 ,
t≥0

by the second equality in (22) with i = 1 and f = g2 . This shows that g1 and g2 can be seen
as inverse cdfs of Nash action distributions in two modified environments that share a common
interaction structure C and complementarity parameters (0, γ1 ) and have type distributions F̃1
and F̃2 with inverse cdfs F̃1−1 := (1 − γ2 TC )g2 and F̃2−1 := (1 − γ1 TC )g2 , respectively. Since
0 ≥ γ1 ≥ γ2 , we have F̃1−1 %d F̃2−1 .
Given this, the arguments in part 2 above imply that g1 %dil g2 , provided we can show
that (1 + γ1 TC )F̃i−1 is increasing for i = 1, 2 (which ensures that the corresponding operators
Γi (·) in the two modified societies are increasing). For i = 1, note that (1 + γ1 TC )F̃2−1 :=
(1 + γ1 TC )(1 − γ2 TC )g2 = (1 + γ1 TC )F −1 , which is increasing by the assumption on Pi and
γ1 > −1. For i = 2, note that (i) (1−γ22 TC2 )g2 = (1+γ2 TC )F −1 is increasing (by the assumption
on Pi and since γ2 > −1), and (ii) γ22 TC2 g2 %d γ12 TC2 g2 as 0 ≥ γ1 ≥ γ2 . Combining (i) and (ii)
yields that (1 + γ1 TC )F̃1−1 := (1 − γ12 TC2 )g2 is increasing, as required.
D.2.6

Proof of Proposition C.5

s,P
0
Fix any ANE sAN =: s and θ. For each θ0 , set ŝθ (θ0 ) := BRθ0 (Ls,P
θ , Lθ ) and F̂θ (θ ) :=
ŝθ ,P̂θ
0
Ls,P
(a) =
θ (ŝθ (θ )), and let P̂θ := F̂θ × F̂θ . To verify observational consistency, note that Lθ
s,P
−1
F̂θ (ŝθ (a)) = Lθ (a) for each a, where the first equality uses P̂θ = F̂θ × F̂θ and the inverse ŝ−1
θ is
well-defined and increasing by the surjectivity and monotonicity assumption on best-responses.
To verify the perceived best-response condition, note that, for each θ0 ,
s,P
ŝθ ,P̂θ
ŝθ (θ0 ) = BRθ0 (Ls,P
, Lŝθθ ,P̂θ ) = BRθ0 (Gŝθ ,P̂θ , Lŝθθ0 ,P̂θ ),
θ , Lθ ) = BRθ0 (Lθ

where the second equality uses observational consistency and the third uses non-assortativity
of P̂θ . Thus, (P̂θ , ŝθ ) is a coherent assortativity neglect perception for type θ.
To show uniqueness, consider any coherent assortativity neglect perception (P̂θ = F̂θ ×
F̂θ , ŝθ ) for θ. Then, for each θ0 , the perceived best-response condition, non-assortativity of
P̂θ , and observational consistency imply ŝθ (θ0 ) = BRθ0 (Gŝθ ,P̂θ , Lŝθθ0 ,P̂θ ) = BRθ0 (Lŝθθ ,P̂θ , Lŝθθ ,P̂θ ) =
s,P
−1
BRθ0 (Ls,P
θ , Lθ ). Moreover, P̂θ = F̂θ × F̂θ and observational consistency imply F̂θ (ŝθ (a)) =
s,P
0
0
0
Lθŝθ ,P̂θ (a) = Ls,P
θ (a) for each a, which yields F̂θ (θ ) = Lθ (ŝθ (θ )) for each θ . Thus, (P̂θ , ŝθ )
coincides with the perceptions in the first paragraph.
D.2.7

Proof of Proposition C.6

Consider any monotone ANE sAN and any Nash equilibrium sN E . For any types θ > θ0 , the
fact that ψ and φ are monotone yields
AN ,P

sAN (θ) − sAN (θ0 ) = φ(θ) − φ(θ0 ) + ψ(Lsθ

AN ,P

) − ψ(Lsθ0
AN

) ≥ φ(θ) − φ(θ0 ) = sN E (θ) − sN E (θ0 ) > 0,
AN

where the first inequality holds because Lsθ ,P FOSD-dominates Lsθ0 ,P (by monotonicity of
AN
NE
sAN and assortativity of P ). Thus, Gs ,P is more dispersive than Gs ,P .
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